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Procedures for informal adjudication' by federal and state administrative agencies and departments have come under increasing
scrutiny in the last six years. The impetus for this focus on procedural regularity was provided by the landmark decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly,2 where the Supreme Court embarked on the difficult course
of defining the procedural ingredients necessary to satisfy the due
process clause. Since then the Court has looked at all manner of
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I The term "informal adjudication" has no commonly accepted meaning. As used in this
article, it broadly refers to administrative decisions that are not governed by statutory procedures, but which nevertheless affect an individual's rights, obligations, or opportunities.
Perhaps it is easier to say what the term does not mean. It does not mean rulemaking, either
formal or informal under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nor does it mean
formal adjudication, as defined either by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA or by organic
agency legislation that establishes comparable procedural formality. A key indicium of formality in this context is the presence of an administrative law judge as the presiding official.
In essence, informal adjudication is a residual category of procedural entitlement that grows
or diminishes in "formality" more by judicial and administrative notions of fairness than by
legislative plan or design. By this definition Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), falls
within the ambit of informal adjudication, even though some would see the elaborate procedures mandated in that case as constituting formal adjudication. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 169-70 (3d ed. 1972). Finally, "adjudication" and "hearing" will be used
interchangeably in this article. While some feel that "hearing" has a fixed meaning in terms
of procedural ingredients, recent cases have indicated a willingness to view a "hearing" as
also including proceedings with fewer ingredients than the traditional hearing was thought
to contain. Compare United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (contemplating a hearing without oral argument or confrontation), with K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 157 n.1 (3d ed. 1972). In any event, the purpose here is not to contribute to a terminological debate, but to look at the kind of procedures that can be utilized to implement the process
of informal adjudication unhampered by definitional preconceptions.
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970). While Goldberg v. Kelly is generally credited with starting what
has become known as the procedural due process "revolution," it has noteworthy antecedents.
For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court articulated explicit hearing procedures not directly as a matter of due process, but as a condition
of the NYSE obtaining immunity from the antitrust laws for its disciplinary actions. The
NYSE subsequently enacted these procedural requirements into its constitution; they include
each of the Goldberg procedural ingredients except right to an attorney, right to see opposing
evidence, and a decision based on the record. See NYSE Constitution Art. XIV, CCH NYSE
GUIDE § 1664 (Oct. 1972); note 172 infra.
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government decision making and has measured the interests at
stake and the procedures employed against what appear to be vague
and shifting standards. However, while not expressly adopted by the
Court, the criteria of fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction to participants emerge inferentially from the opinions.3 These three criteria
reflect well-known legal and social science measures of the appropriateness of official behavior that, once identified, offer basic measures of performance that are without substantial controversy.'
The controversy occurs when one seeks to apply these criteria
in particular contexts. When it comes to termination of welfare
benefits (Goldberg itself), an impressive array of procedures is required by due process, and informal adjudication is virtually converted into a trial-type hearing.5 Outside the welfare area, however,
the requirements of procedural due process are interpreted differently, depending upon a judicial application of the three criteria
implicit in the Goldberg cases to the facts at hand. For example,
prison and school disciplinary "hearing" requirements bear only
slight resemblance to the elaborate procedural model imposed by
Goldberg.' Other examples of procedural choices within the spectrum abound in the many Supreme Court, circuit court, and district
court opinions that have interpreted Goldberg.7 These opinions exhibit the common difficulty of having to apply the general Goldberg
criteria in specific situations. What is lacking is a theory for refining
the criteria and establishing a methodology for applying them to
evaluate informal adjudication procedures in particular cases.
In Goldberg, the fairness and efficiency criteria are implicit in the Court's concern with
preventing an "erroneous termination" of important benefits, which, given the prospect of
the terminated recipient's "brutal need," justifies a potential drain on the public fisc. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion also reflects concern with the satisfaction criterion when he observes that adding pretermination procedures to the welfare system "guards against the
societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity." 397 U.S. at 265. Two of these criteria, satisfaction and efficiency, are the province of
the social sciences (sociology, psychology, and economics), while the third, fairness, is primarily within the province of the law. It is assumed here, however, that all three criteria are, or
should be, relevant to legal analysis.
Fairness implies procedural justice; efficiency, optimum resource allocation; and satisfaction, participant trust in the process. See Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings
in NuclearPower PlantSiting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 591-93 (1972), where the three criteria are
identified as accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability.
5 The Goldberg majority does not require "a complete record and a comprehensive opinion" at the pretermination stage. 397 U.S. at 267. As to what the Court does require, see text
and note at note 80 infra. For a useful checklist of required and excluded procedures, see K.
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TExT-PROBLEMS 288 (5th ed. 1973).
6 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
' By informal count over 20 Supreme Court, 100 circuit court, and 250 district court
opinions have cited and dealt with Goldberg as of January 1976. Several of these opinions
will be discussed in the pages that follow.
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Post-Goldbergcases indicate that there is room for considerable
experimentation in designing agency procedures in many areas
where judicial constraints on informal adjudications have not yet
been clarified. Indeed, the subsequent opinions in Arnett v.
Kennedy 8 and Mathews v. Eldridge9 have raised speculation about
the continued commitment of a majority of the Supreme Court to
the basic propositions underlying Goldberg itself. In Arnett, the
Court may have reduced the procedural due process entitlement to
the vanishing point by approving a pretermination procedure that
allowed a supervisor accused of improper conduct by a nonprobationary civil servant to determine whether the accusations were sufficiently unwarranted to justify the employee's dismissal. In
Eldridge, the Court distinguished Goldberg and approved mere
written pretermination procedures, rather than the full arsenal of
Goldberg ingredients, for Social Security Act disability benefits.
Whether the principles of Goldberg are perishing is not yet clear,
but certainly the Court has shown it intends to preserve flexibility
in the designation of particular procedural ingredients. In Wolff v.
McDonnell,'0 for example, the majority reemphasized:
We have often repeated that "[t]he very nature of due process
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. .

.

. [C]onsideration of

what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of
the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action.""
This desire for principled flexibility reinforces the need to develop criteria and establish a methodology for applying them. So
long as Goldberg concerns play a role in the choice of procedures in
the informal adjudication context, this task will occupy much of the
courts' time.
Since the phrase "informal adjudication" describes about 90
percent of what the government does with respect to the individual,'1 it is fair to say that the Goldberg cases, numerous as they are,
have only scratched the surface of informal governmental action. It
8 416 U.S.

134 (1974).
9 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 560, quoting Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
0 See Gardner, The Proceduresby Which Informal Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155,
156 (1972).
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seems likely that a wealth of informal adjudications occur daily in
a procedural framework that is untouched by Goldberg-inspired
considerations of procedural due process. This supposition raises
several inquiries of importance to courts and administrators. To
what extent do informal adjudications in fact reflect principles of
the Goldberg procedural due process revolution? In what respect are
the procedural ingredients of Goldberg, or some of them, appropriate or inappropriate in these kinds of informal adjudications? In
what way might satisfactory alternatives to Goldberg procedures be
made available? Each of these inquiries builds to the ultimate question of what methodology should be used to determine whether a
procedural framework meets the underlying criteria of fairness, satisfaction, and efficiency implicit in Goldberg and its progeny.
This study endeavors to answer these questions theoretically
and in terms of an empirical analysis of informal adjudication procedures. The organization is as follows: Part I presents the beginning of a theory for determining and applying criteria of good informal procedures; the discussion is largely deductive and intuitive,
but it draws from selected legal and social scientific studies and
hypotheses. The core of the article is in Part II, where an empirical
survey of the informal procedures utilized by four federal agencies
in four functional categories is described and analyzed. Part III
assesses the data collected in Part II in terms of the theories and
postulates of Part I; an attempt is made to integrate theory and
practice in such a way as to create an overall scheme for determining
appropriate and constitutional procedures across a variety of informal adjudicative settings. Part IV makes specific recommendations
for future research and draws conclusions from this study.
I.

A

PRELIMINARY THEORY OF INFORMAL ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES

Few would disagree with the proposition that all government
decision making should employ procedures that produce fair and
accurate results, that are seen as doing this by those subjected to
the process, and that do so at the lowest system cost. If it were
possible to maximize each of these goals in every case the ideal
administration would be at hand. Unfortunately, it is rarely possible
to do so in any particular case, let alone across the system as a
whole. Ironically, the tendency is for the conflicts among these goals
to intensify when the government's activity takes on critical importance to the individual. 13 For example, the concern with fairness and
" Part of the reason for this conflict among criteria stems from the fact that each discipline of the social sciences is inhibited from relating its own measures of individual behavior
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satisfaction in the individual Social Security disability determination must be tempered by the realization that the efficiency of the
disability decision system is currently undermined by an overwhelming backlog of undecided cases." The difficulty is that there
is no available theory for deciding which one or ones among the
criteria should play a subordinated role. Each commands respect as
a fundamental measure, and that makes the task of reconciliation
in particular contexts formidable indeed. A theory of reconciliation
becomes, in essence, a basic guide to the way government authority
over the individual in the context of informal adjudication is to be
legitimated in our society. Its importance can hardly be overstated.
As a matter of Anglo-American culture, the historically favored
system for dispute resolution is the adversary system, where control
is reserved to the litigants, and the decision maker assumes a passive role. But there has long been a tension between the adversary
system and large-scale government decision making. The adversary
system reflects the noninterventionist values of the early American
experience that were premised upon a distrust of government power.
Roscoe Pound, writing in 1913, captured this spirit well.
[T]he chief problem of the formative period of American law
was to discover and lay down rules; to develop a system of
certain and detailed rules which, on the one hand, would meet
the requirements of American life, and, on the other hand,
would tie down the magistrate by leaving as little to his personal judgment and discretion as possible, would leave as much
as possible to the initiative of the individual, and would keep
down all governmental and official action to the minimum required for the harmonious coexistence of the individual and the
whole. This problem determined the whole course of our legal15
development until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
to those of other disciplines. Thus, the economist's maximization principle has not been
coordinated with the sociologist's or psychologist's satisfaction principle in any effective way.
Much interdisciplinary theorizing needs to be done if problems like those addressed in this
article are to be solved by the social sciences. A notable attempt to integrate the social
sciences through the discovery of a "meta-ethics" common to economics, sociology, and
psychology (as well as political science) has been undertaken recently by Professor Duncan
Macrae. Macrae advocates union of the social sciences within the framework of policy analysis. "The social sciences aim at reasoned understanding and prediction of human behavior.
They aim to supplement or replace intuition, which is particularly important in anticipating
the consequences of large-scale policy choices." D. MACRAE, THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCEs 29 (1976). This is the kind of approach that could improve understanding of
the procedural policy choices described here.
1 See Hearingson Delays in Social SecurityAppeals Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975) (referring to a 100,000 case backlog).
11Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARv. L. REv. 302, 306
(1913).
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The shortcomings of this kind of procedural approach in the context
of twentieth century government social programs are not difficult to
discern. Dean Pound, for example, was writing to legitimate the
magistrate's court of the City of Chicago, which provided the magistrate with the power to control litigation in the manner of the continental inquisitor. The need for this control was due to the "accumulated mass of litigation" generated by the "conditions of urban
life.""6 Today the concern is with mass justice in the social welfare
area. But the question remains the same: to what degree should the
adversary system be modified or supplanted in order to meet the
decision-making needs of the modern state?
Adversary procedures have typically been reserved for the formal side of the dispute resolution process, whether it be criminal,
civil, or administrative. In federal administrative decision making,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) supplies the requisite adversary formality for "formal" rulemaking and adjudication in sections 554, 556, and 557. But administrative decision making labeled
here as informal adjudication is largely unaddressed procedurally
by the APA,17 even though those decisions have long been considered "truly the life blood of the administrative process. '"'8 When it
comes to designating procedures for informal adjudication as a matter of due process, or of prudent agency practice in anticipation of
judicial intervention, the adversary system and the formal adjudication side of the APA often provide conclusive analogies. But there
is no reason to mimic adversary model solutions automatically, es"1 Id. at 312. Pound's article contains valuable insights, which are entirely relevant
today. Of the role of judges in "petty causes" he notes: "Thus the judge cannot be a mere
umpire. He must actively seek the truth and the law, largely if not wholly unaided." Id. at
319. See also text at notes 71-72 infra (Judge Friendly's views on inquisitorial alternatives).
Pound's article was instrumental in the development of informal decision making at the state
and municipal levels, such as small claims and magistrates courts. See W. HAEMMEL, CONSUMER LAW 301 (1975). A few years earlier Pound had shocked the established lawyers of the
day by addressing the American Bar Association on the inefficiencies and inequities of the
adversary system of justice or, as he called it, the "sporting theory of justice." Pound, The
Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395
(1906), reprinted in abridgedform, 57 A.B.A.J. 348 (1971). Recently the ABA convened to
honor Pound's 1906 speech on its 70th Anniversary. Significantly, the Chief Justice of the
United States keynoted the convocation by endorsing many of Pound's insights into nineteenth century jurisprudence and his inquisitorial system alternatives. Burger, Agenda for
2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation, excerpted in The Direction of the Administration Justice, 62 A.B.A.J. 727 (1976).
"7 The only "informal" procedural formulation relates to informal rulemaking in section
553(c), which allows rules to be promulgated after notice, an opportunity for public written
or oral comment, and a concise statement of basis and purpose. See also text and note at
note 228 infra.
,S ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 35 (1941).
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pecially in the mass justice area. What is increasingly needed are
some minimum procedural guidelines that ensure fairness without
unduly encumbering the decision system.'9 The Government has
long employed investigation, inspection, testing, examination, and
conference procedures without reliance upon the adversary model,2
and without any apparent adverse consequences. This experience
should indicate that even though the adversary solution is instructive, its use should be at most a presumptive one, rebuttable upon
a showing of "better" procedural solutions. If agencies were encouraged to explore system alternatives as well as procedural modifications within the adversary system, they might be better able to
evaluate how much adversariness is necessary in a particular situation and when the adversary system should be turned to at all. But
a systematic approach to these questions is currently lacking, and
it remains a major task to develop a theory of good informal procedures that can examine methods of selecting procedural ingredients
in the adversary context and conditions under which it may be
appropriate to depart from the adversary model altogether. Such a
theory might proceed by deciding whether the presumptive criteria
of fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction can be of assistance in designing guidelines for the selection of good informal adjudication
procedures.
A.

Fairness and Efficiency: Valuing Interests

Is there an optimum level of fairness? The question, which
presupposes a balance of benefits and costs, is a disturbing one,2'
but it is nonetheless being asked (and answered) in many informal
adjudication cases. The courts are concerned with the importance
of the particular government benefit to the individual and with the
costs to the Government of being denied summary disposition and
of having to provide the desired procedures. In Goldberg, the importance of continued welfare payments pending a decision on eligi" In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975), the Court appeared to be searching for
such a procedural minimum when it required the "rudimentary precaution" of "an informal
give-and-take between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior to suspension from
school." 419 U.S. at 581, 584.
21 See K. DAVIS, supra note 5, at 290-91. See also Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th
Cir. 1975) (an unlimited right to retake Georgia bar examination is an acceptable due process
alternative to review of failing grades).
21 One thoughtful commentator has suggested that this kind of utilitarian interest balancing (cost to government outweighing individual benefits) "is difficult to reconcile with the
traditional view that the Bill of Rights limits the power of government to pursue even policies
which benefit the majority." Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1525 (1975).
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bility was emphasized by the individual's "brutal need" and "immediately desperate" situation.12 After this characterization, the
government's interest in summary procedures to protect the "public
fisc" receded in importance. In other situations, however, the importance of the issue to the individual is less and the government
interest in summary procedures will be accorded commensurately
greater weight. In these circumstances, the balance shifts away from
elaborate procedural protections. This occurred in Arnett v.
Kennedy,2 where the Supreme Court approved a civil service procedure that granted a federal employee only the minimal adversary
procedures of notice, written comments (answer and affidavits), and
a statement of reasons before dismissal for cause. 24 Distinguishing
Goldberg, the Court approved these procedures as a matter of due
process because of the employee's less severe income deprivation (he
could presumably get another job or go on welfare) and the
Government's interest in reducing substantial overhead costs pend2
ing a full posttermination hearing.
Striking the balance between benefits (to the individual) and
costs (to the system) requires the court to value opposing interests
on a case-by-case or class of cases basis. It would seem inevitable,
unless each case is to become an endless inquiry into personal idiosyncrasies, that broad decisions have to be made about the value
and importance of particular government benefits to affected individuals. 2 A social scientist would be reluctant to make such largescale value judgments that ignore individual differences and involve
interpersonal comparisons of utility that are necessarily subjective.? But this reluctance, while understandable as a scientific matter, is too often an impermissible luxury for judges and administra22

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 264 (1970).

416 U.S. 134 (1974).
5 U.S.C. § 7501(b) (1970).
25 416 U.S. at 155; id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring). The absence of "brutal need" was
also used by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-43 (1976), to distinguish
Goldberg in denying a full-blown pretermination hearing to an applicant for Social Security
disability payments. While Eldridge had far fewer opportunities than Arnett to find alternative sources of income (welfare based on disability-viz., Supplemental Security Incomewas not available, and job opportunities were apparently nonexistent), the Court nonetheless found his condition less severe than Goldberg's because of the potential availability of
state and local assistance and food stamps. Id. at 342 n.27.
11Although the judgments are not made in terms of each individual's interests, but
rather by some average of interests for a particular class of beneficiaries, see Note, supra note
21, at 1522, at some point the interest in providing additional procedural ingredients may well
become an individual one. For example, 'cross-examination of a witness will frequently be
considered only after a showing of particularized prejudice. See note 19 supra & note 39 infra.
" See, e.g., K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 3-6 (1951).
24
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tors involved in day-to-day decision making. It is the fate of these
policy makers to act on the best data available at the time, 28 which
may consist largely of their untutored notions about the relative
importance of government benefits to different classes of individuals.
Obviously common sense valuations of individual benefits received from government activities are rough approximations, and
attempts made to refine the process deserve attention. Judge
Friendly, for example, has offered a hierarchy of government action
ranked in terms of seriousness to the individual that is particularly
useful here.29 He would first distinguish between action that changes
the individual's existing status and that which denies a request or
benefit.' In the former category he ranks, in order of seriousness, (1)
actions depriving an individual of liberty (parole revocation, civil
commitment, deportation); (2) revocation of professional licenses;
(3) termination of public benefits (welfare, school, housing); and (4)
reduction of those public benefits. While one might disagree with
certain rankings, such a valuation scheme can become an indispensible first step to selecting appropriate procedures for a particular
class of cases. It would seem that government departments or agencies that undertake to rank programs in terms of these interests are
bound to refine their awareness of the appropriate procedural ingre3
dients for various informal adjudications. '
See generally Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79
(1959); notes 222, 225 infra.
See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1295-304 (1975).
Id. at 1295-96. The Court has long distinguished for due process purposes between
termination of existing benefits and denial of future benefits. See generally B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 238-43 (1976).
3, Further agency investigation along these lines could include an empirical study of

existing procedures to determine client satisfaction. Such a study might inquire as follows:
Are there a significant number of requests for additional procedures, and complaints about
existing informal adjudication schemes? If there are internal review procedures, how many
initial informal decisions reach that level, are then overturned, and for what reasons? Have
there been a significant number of judicial decisions relating to particular procedures, and
what have the courts advised? While some courts have mandated specific procedural ingredients as a matter of due process, Goldberg being a prominent example, many courts (including
the Supreme Court in other cases) have preferred to let the agency work out satisfactory
procedures. For arguments against a federal judge "evolving a code of administrative procedure" in particular cases, see Friendly, supra note 29, at 1301-02; Monaghan, Foreword:
ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1975).
If these kinds of inquiries are made in the context of procedural rulemaking, a forum is
established that would serve to enlighten the agency further about the choice of informal
procedures. Comments on proposed rules could be received directly from those affected by
the system and their representatives. The advantage of employing this approach is that both
the agency and the courts would be better informed about the need for procedural ingredients
from the clients' perspective. While an agency need not follow section 553 procedures for

The University of Chicago Law Review

B.

[43:739

Fairness and Efficiency: Valuing Procedures

The balancing process employed to value individual interests
in government programs has been used as well to value the need for
each of the procedural ingredients traditionally attaching to adversary decision making. In Frost v. Weinberger,3 2 Judge Friendly assessed the Supreme Court's opinions since Goldberg and concluded,
The Court's decisions can fairly be summarized as holding that
the required degree of procedural safeguards varies directly
with the importance of the private interest affected and the
need for and usefulness of the particular safeguard in the given
the burden and other adverse
circumstances and inversely with
3
consequences of affording it.1
This balancing test does not, of course, instruct as to what procedural ingredients are necessary in each case, and that remains the
primary challenge. While there are circumstances where the balancing test might yield an individual interest so insignificant that no
procedural ingredients will be called for, 34 most cases should be able
to set limits upon the number and nature of the procedural ingredients that can be balanced away. To discover this informal procedure
floor, it is instructive to note that the "informal" procedure reference in the APA-section 553(c), relating to informal rulemaking-provides that rules may be enacted after notice, an opportunity for written or oral public comment, and a concise statement of
the reasons for issuance." This three-ingredient formulation, while
interpretative or procedural rules, there is no reason it cannot do so, and on occasion this has
been done to good effect. See notes 104, 228 infra.
32 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975). The Court approved the prereduction procedures under the
Social Security Administration's survivor benefit program.
1 Id. at 66. See also Friendly, supra note 29, at 1278.
11In Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866 (1961), the Court balanced
away entirely a government employee's right to procedural ingredients before being excluded
from working at a military installation. The logic of the opinion is confined to those seemingly
rare circumstances where the private interest in other job opportunities was unaffected by
the government action. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976).
11It should be noted that the courts have seen section 553(c) informal rulemaking procedures as expandable in particular cases. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (allowing a limited right to cross-examination in
informal rulemaking). See generally Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA.
L. REV. 185, 230-42 (1974); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the AdministrativeProcedure Act: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 401 (1975). A similar approach
appears to be developing in terms of informal adjudication. One court has held that prerecoupment oral hearings for overpayments under the Social Security Act should not be required "where the factual disputes are as well suited to resolution by documentary proof and
written submissions as by oral hearings." Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 164 (3d Cir.
1975). This approach tends to support Professor Davis's view that procedures ought to be
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it pertains to rulemaking, which is not central to the inquiry here,
provides a context for identifying the minimal procedural ingredients in informal adjudication. In a sense, informal rulemaking procedures reflect the core ingredients of any procedural system that
is at all concerned with the values of fairness, satisfaction, and
efficiency. It would be difficult to imagine even a streamlined adversary system that did not provide an individual with notice, an opportunity to comment, and a statement of reasons before adverse
action is taken. 6
In addition, Arnett v. Kennedy, Mathews v. Eldridge, and
Frost v. Weinberger suggest on their facts clear limits upon the use
of the balancing process. All three cases review informal procedures
that provide the minimal (informal rulemaking-type) procedures of
notice, written comment, and statement of reasons.-" There is no
indication that the cases would have approved procedures that were
more summary than those presented. Moreover, the cases were decided against a backdrop of full hearing procedures that provided
posttermination review. The availability of this kind of review is
certainly pertinent to the construction of an acceptable floor for the
informal due process hearing. 8
In order to balance the valuation ledger above this minimum,
it is necessary to place the individual procedural ingredients in a
hierarchal order similar to the one established for individual interests. Assuming one had each of the Goldberg ingredients to work
determined by the existence of adjudicative facts. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
160-61 (3d ed. 1972); note 75 infra.
1 In certain informal adjudications, notably rights of tenants in federally subsidized
housing to contest rent increases, some lower courts have openly accepted a three-ingredient
minimum procedure (of notice, opportunity for written comments, and concise statement of
reasons) reminiscent of the informal rulemaking model. See Paulsen v. Coachlight Apartments Co., 507 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1974); Geneva Towers Tenant's Org. v. Federated Mortgage
Inv., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Thompson
v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'g McKinney v. Washington, 442 F.2d 726
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Bloodworth v. Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Cal. 1972); cf. Caulder
v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970) (hearing on eviction from subsidized housing). Compare B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 71 (1976) with Langevin v.
Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that governmental rent increases involved adjudicative facts).
3, In Mathews v. Eldridge, the S.S.A. additionally offered the applicant an opportunity
to rebut in writing its tentative determination to deny disability benefits. 424 U.S. at 33839.
" In Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1974), the Court remanded a challenge to Connecticut's procedures for termination of unemployment compensation for a determination of
the effect of reforms designed to assure prompt administrative review. The Court reemphasized this factor in Mathews v. Eldridge, where it found the administrative review process,
taking an average of one year, excessively slow. 424 U.S. at 341-42.
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with, it would be most helpful to know which ingredients are worth
more to the individual and which, in turn, cost more for the
Government to provide.39 Two recent studies have sought to evaluate procedural ingredients on empirical and. theoretical grounds.
Professor William Popkin has focused on the value of the right to
counsel ingredient in disability claims proceedings." His conclusions were most enlightening. While a represented claimant was no
better off at the investigatory (nonadversary) stage, his chance of
success was significantly improved by the presence of a representative at the adjudicatory stage. Moreover, according to Popkin,
"[R]epresentatives make greater use of procedures than unrepresented claimants but there was no support for the proposition that
they needlessly complicate the administrative process."" These
conclusions are valuable aids in assessing the benefits and costs
surrounding the right to representation. And even though they pertain directly to only one ingredient-a representative-the presence
of that ingredient to a large extent determines the use and need of
some of the other procedural ingredients.
Judge Friendly's theoretical study also seeks to establish a hierarchy of procedural ingredients. While this study is nonempirical,
2
it gains stature since it is by an acknowledged procedural expert.
Judge Friendly places the highest value on three fundamentals of
procedural due process. 3 Two of the three (notice and opportunity
for written comment)44 have already been characterized as due process minimum ingredients. The third is the right to an "impartial"
tribunal, which is a term of many meanings in the administrative
context. 5 Ideally the agency should go outside its own organization
11Here the inquiry is more related to the individual, since depending on the facts of a
given case, some procedures such as cross-examination will be of greater or lesser importance.
See note 26 supra.
11W. Popkin, Report for the Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs of the Administrative Conference of the United States, June 27, 1975 (unpublished final draft). The views
are those of the author, not those of the committee or the conference.
41 Id.
42 But not necessarily an institutionally unbiased one. See note 53 infra.
13 Friendly, supra note 29, at 1279-92.
1 Judge Friendly makes written comments the usual rule, subject to the need for oral
comments in particular cases due to the subject matter or the claimant's ability to understand the case. This flexibility tracks the written/oral hearing choice offered agencies in
section 553 rulemaking and further highlights the connection between the informal rulemaking model and informal adjudication. See Friendly, supra note 29, at 1281.
15Impartiality does not require total independence from the government agency or the
presence of an administrative law judge. Goldberg required decision maker independence
only from the individual action to be decided. 397 U.S. at 271. But cf. note 207 infra. Of
course, the more independence the decider has, the more unbiased the tribunal appears and
becomes. As Judge Friendly has observed, "the further the tribunal is removed from the
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to find a suitably unbiased judge, but this will often be impractical.4" Nevertheless, there should be every incentive to maximize the
independence of deciders within each agency by insulating them
from contact with enforcement and investigatory personnel. If the
appearance and reality of bias is minimized, not only will two of the
essential measures of good procedure-satisfaction and fairness-be
enhanced, but in the long run the agency can maximize the efficiency measure as well. This is because, as Judge Friendly suggests,
a more impartial tribunal may reduce the need (and perhaps the
demand) for additional procedural ingredients such as confrontation, a transcript, and oral presentation.4 7 These additional ingredients would be particularly wasteful if, as it postulated, the satisfaction and fairness measures could be met at lower cost by using a
more impartial decider. It may be advisable, then, to consider impartiality (above the Goldberg impartiality minimum) 8 as a shifting fourth ingredient that, when present, can act as a surrogate for
other ingredients. In this way, even if the courts will not directly
require substantial impartiality from agency deciders, the presence
of this factor in the particular case may change the mix of other
ingredients required by procedural due process.
Judge Friendly is dubious about the propriety of the other procedural ingredients (such as a right to know opposing evidence, to
call witnesses, to cross-examine, and to be represented by counsel)
in the informal adjudication context. He points out the tendencies
of these ingredients to expand controversies and suggests that a
"just decision" might more efficiently be obtained by abandoning
the adversary system and employing the continental inquisitorial
system." Since this alternative has frequently been proposed in
agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural
safeguards; while all judges must be unbiased, some may be, or appear to be, more unbiased
than others." Friendly, supra note 29, at 1279.
" Friendly, supra note 29, at 1279, 1289.
47Id.
11See note 45 supra.The Court's views on decider impartiality have arguably retrenched
in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), and Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n, 96 S. Ct. 2308 (1976). See text at notes 8-9 supra. In the Hortonville case the
Court approved of a school board disciplinary hearing against striking teachers presided over
by the same board members who had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a collective bargaining
contract. The Court seemed clearly to employ a procedural balancing of interests test to the
question of decider impartiality. "A showing that the Board was 'involved' in the events
preceding this decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power
given by the state legislature, is not enough to overcome the presumption of honesty and
integrity in policymakers with decisionmaking power." 96 S. Ct. at 2316. Compare Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), with text and
note at note 207 infra.
" Friendly, supra note 29, at 1289.
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mass justice informal decision making, it deserves further
examination here.
C.

Satisfaction and Fairness: Inquisitorial or Adversary Solutions

Informed observers of the administrative process have lately
reflected upon our inability to develop alternatives to the adversary
model in situations where trial-type procedures appear ill-suited
and even counterproductive;" and Judge Friendly has suggested
that part of our resistance to "inquisitorial" alternatives may stem
from the prejorative connotation of the term itself.5' While many
agree that the continental system has lessons for administration in
this country, the difficulty has been to determine when and where
such procedures are appropriate. The most progress in this direction
has been in the area of scientific "fact finding" in rulemaking,5 2 but
the application of inquisitorial, or investigatory, techniques to infor3
mal adjudication is the subject of continuing professional debate.1
What is needed is a theory for deciding when inquisitorial solutions
are better than adversary ones.
In a behaviorial science-legal study by Professors Thibaut and
Walker, such a theory is offered. 4 The authors conclude generally
that by satisfaction and fairness measures, the adversary system
offers a "just procedure" that is "clearly superior" to the inquisi11Boyer,

Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex

Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Cramton, supra note 4;
Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIP. L. REV. 479
(1966). For earlier expressions of similar concerns, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

711-18 (5th ed. 1970).

11Friendly, supra note 29, at 1290. As a neutral alternative, Judge Friendly offers the
term "investigatory." Id. Professor Schwartz identifies the outstanding characteristic distinguishing inquisitorial procedure from adversary procedure to be the assumption by the judge
of an active role in developing the case. B. SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE
COMMON LAW WORLD 133 (1954). He sees the inquisitorial type of procedure as operating more
"efficiently" and "fairly" than the adversary solution in mass justice situations. B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 254 (1976).
11See Boyer, supra note 50.
*3 Compare Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The EmergingLegal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965), with Handler, supra note 50. It is not surprising that judges might be
the ones most concerned about inquisitorial alternatives to the adversary model because they
are firsthand observers of the inefficiencies of the present system. Moreover, federal court
judges, with increasing use of the pretrial conference technique, are learning how to assert
more control over the adversary process. Judge Friendly and Judge Frankel, two of our most
scholarly federal judges, are suggesting major shifts in control when they pose inquisitorial
alternatives to traditional adversary solutions, whether or not such shifts are described as
investigatory. See Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1034 (1975); Friendly, supra note 29.
1, J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975)
[hereinafter cited as THIBAUT & WALKER].
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torial system.5 Their core finding is that a just procedure is one
where the locus of control remains in the parties." It is this insight
that differentiates the inquisitorial from the adversary system.
The most obvious differences between adversary and inquisitorial models reflect the basic distinction in the locus of control
as between the disputants and thc third party. In the adversary
model each party to the dispute is usually represented by an
openly biased advocate who is charged with exercising his
party's control while seeking to establish the validity of his or
her contentions. The roles of adversarial attorneys are therefore
somewhat anomalous: overtly they act in contentious support
of conflicting claims, yet they constitute a tacit coalition to
maintain a high degree of disputant control over the process.
In an inquisitorial system, however, either there are no attorneys at all or attorneys are assigned the primary responsibility
57
of assisting the decisionmaker in developing his decision.
Thibaut and Walker derive the superiority of the adversary
system from a series of laboratory experiments which simulated
various institutional modes of conflict resolution. The subjects (who
were assigned roles as participants and observers) were tested to
reveal what form of procedures they favored and for what reasons.
The results indicate that a fair or just procedure is seen as one that
combats any bias decision makers import into the resolution process." And the adversary system was found to optimize the condition of fairness or justice, in that it would be chosen by those in John
Rawls's A Theory of Justice who are behind the veil of ignorance.
These findings lead the authors to speculate that the right to a
hearing in the context of informal adjudication should include ingredients of the adversary model, even under conditions involving
a heavy caseload." While the authors have admittedly made no
Id. at 1-2, 118.
5' Id. at 22-27.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 41-53. See also Lind, Thibaut & Walker, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the
Effect of Adversary and InquisitorialProcesses on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L.
REV. 271 (1976).
11Id. at 102-16. See also Thibaut, Walker, La Tour & Houlden, ProceduralJustice as
Fairness,26 STAN. L. REv. 1271 (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19, 136-42 (1971).
11THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 54, at 122-24. The ingredient particularly emphasized
is an attorney or representative, which the authors see as a central factor contributing to
satisfaction with the process. See also text at notes 40-41 supra (discussing the empirical
conclusions of Professor Popkin on the value of representatives at the hearing stage).
5
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findings based on the efficiency criterion," their conclusions with
respect to satisfaction and fairness would appear to contradict those
long held by procedural scholars from Roscoe Pound to Henry
Friendly. Hence these conclusions must be given careful critical
consideration.12 For the purposes of the present inquiry, however,
much of what Thibaut and Walker conclude can be substantially
reconciled with the notion of minimal adversary due process (notice,
right to comment, statement of reasons) offered earlier as a basic
condition of informal adjudication. 3 The authors acknowledge that
simple adversary procedures (as the three ingredients certainly are)
can be adequate to achieve procedural justice. The only additional
ingredient the authors would see as indispensable is the right to a
representative, since it is that ingredient which most distinguishes
the adversary system from the inquisitorial. 4
Moreover, the Thibaut-Walker research suggests an approach
to deciding when the inquisitorial model might be preferable to the
adversary one in the informal adjudication context. The authors
found some situations where subjects preferred an inquisitorial,
control-in-the-decision-maker, procedural solution. They conclude
that "autocratic procedures are likely to be sought by men in hurried pursuit of common goals, who agree on a standard (a credo or
an ideological canon) that can be quickly applied to resolve disputes
in belief." 5 The operative elements of this exception to the usually
preferred adversary solution are: correspondent interests, existing
standards, and time pressure.
The first element, correspondent interests, suggests "conceptual" disputes, where both parties have an interest in a correct or
"better" solution. This may be the case when the dispute centers
1!THIBAuT & WALKER, supra note 54, at 123. The authors suggest, however, that their
satisfaction-fairness finding might be relevant to efficiency measures if the satisfaction criterion is seen as a reflection of the need to internalize the social costs of procedural systems.
,1One criticism is that the authors place their subjects in the posture of litigants, as
plaintiffs, defendants, or observers of a civil or criminal case. Conceivably, if the subject
matter is less inherently litigious, as many administrative decisions tend to be, the responses
of the subjects might be less oriented to the adversary solution.
" See text and notes at notes 19, 35-37 supra.
, See text at note 57 supra. The authors provided their laboratory subjects with representatives, so the question of inability to afford counsel was not explored. While this makes
the research less relevant to the real world problems of providing representation, the issue of
a right to appointed counsel has been addressed as a component of informal adjudication only
in the parole hearings context. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-91 (1973). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
65THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 54, at 16. To take a simple example, one might consider
a sports referee to be an ideal autocrat, from the perspectives of both the participants and
the observers.
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on matters in the scientific realm, as when researchers are testing
hypotheses against established standards of truth. But this kind of
relationship may also be present in informal adjudications surrounding certain kinds of public grants and benefits." Even in the
social welfare area, where much contention and dissatisfaction appears to arise, the Government's interest in providing ihose eligible
with the appropriate level of benefits suggests some correspondence
of interests. Since the role of Government in Social Security disability determinations, for example, is not to allocate limited resources among a few of many eligibles, there are no necessary winners or losers fighting over a fixed sum set aside for disability purposes. In other granting or licensing programs, however, the Government limits the award to one of many deserving applicants. Here
interest conflicts among potential beneficiaries and the Government
are heightened. Adversary procedures (even including in some situations the comparative hearing process)"7 are more prevalent in
these situations and, by the fairness and satisfaction standards by
Thibaut and Walker, would be the preferred institutional approach.
A second condition identified for acceptable inquisitorial solutions is the presence of agreed-upon standards. Lack of clear standards is a common feature of informal adjudication, and for this
reason the plea has frequently been made" for agencies to establish
standards through rulemaking as a means of checking unfettered
discretion." The Thibaut-Walker research appears strongly to support these reforms. Moreover, if an agency is shown that the formulation of standards can legitimate certain inquisitorial procedures in
informal adjudication, the agency's incentive to adopt standards is
" Conceivably, when the matter involved is grants for scientific research, such as National Science Foundation or National Institute of Health grants, the Government tends to
act as an autocrat with the tacit permission of the applicants, since in theory both the
Government and the applicants are part of a community of scholars working toward the goal
of funding the best research applications. To the extent that this theory holds true, the
interests of the decider and the applicants can be viewed as correspondent.
,7The obvious examples here are the awarding of broadcast licenses and airline routes.
See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). But the comparative hearing
process can logically be extended far beyond those categories. These situations differ from
the scientific grant context (NSF or NIH grants), see note 66 supra, for even though there is
a limited grant pie to be divided in those situations, the nature of scientific inquiry is such
that clear choices, understood by all participants, can often be made among applications. But
cf. Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972) (Freedom of
Information Act claim for disclosure of consultant memoranda supporting denial of plaintiff's
NEH application).
'1

See, e.g., H.

FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER

DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).

o See generally K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55-59 (1969).
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presumably increased. If the parties and the decider share an understanding of the operative elements of the decision process, the demand for adversary procedures and the system costs usually connected with their presence are reduced, and the interests served by
the efficiency criterion are maximized. The government inspection
process is a good example of how this approach works already. When
the regulated parties are aware of the inspection standards to be
applied and the government inspector is known to apply these
standards, the inspector becomes an inquisitor by mutual assent.
An adversary process in this context would in all likelihood be cumbersome, costly, and nonsatisfactory, even though the inspection
itself is undoubtedly a form of informal adjudication.
The third condition of the suggested inquisitorial exception to
the adversary model is that of time pressure. To some extent the
presence of time pressure may merely indicate that the parties do
not place a high value on the Government's decision. Thus, for example, no one would dispute the park ranger's inquisitorial decision
to deny an applicant a back country use permit because of his
somewhat subjective conclusion that the park has reached maximum tolerance limits. Most would probably agree that a hearing on
that particular informal adjudication would be a procedural fetish.
But there are other situations where the interest may be of considerable value to the participants, but nonetheless conditioned by the
need for fast decision making. In the granting process, for example,
the government agency will frequently have the assignment to dispense funds for particular projects within a fiscal year. This forces
the application process into an inquisitorial mold. And the prospective applicants, while they stand to benefit considerably by a favorable award, will in all likelihood share the need for expedited decision making. What is usually sought are quick answers to requests
so that alternative plans can be made. Moreover, even though applications are denied initially, they can often be renewed successfully
in subsequent years. Thus, if the applicant gets some indication as
to the strengths and weaknesses of his application, he may have
received a satisfactory response.
D.

Fairness, Efficiency, Satisfaction: A Summary

The foregoing analysis suggests two principal methods of reconciling the criteria of fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction in evaluating procedural choices in informal adjudication. The first method
is the use of benefit-cost calculations in valuing procedures on fairness and efficiency grounds. Although such calculations are neces-
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sarily imprecise, their application can be refined by a careful focus
on the seriousness of the interest at stake, the benefit of the particular ingredient to the individual, and the cost to the Government of
providing it. This balancing methodology is inevitably controversial, since it postulates a utilitarian solution to the allocation of
basic individual rights. Fairness seems to dictate a procedural minimum of notice, comment, and reasons before informal adjudication
can be legitimated.
To go below this threshold of adversary due process, it is necessary to turn to a second method of reconciling the three presumptive
criteria, suggested by the new behaviorial science research of Professors Thibaut and Walker. They offer findings, based on satisfaction
and fairness criteria, that confirm the general superiority of adversary procedures."0 But their research also isolates a category of informal adjudications where the inquisitorial system is preferable to the
adversary. In controversies involving corresponding interests, clear
standards, and temporal urgency, the inquisitorial model is both
fair and satisfactory. This theoretical contribution is important and
timely because it encourages experimentation with nonadversary
procedural solutions in contexts like the mass justice area where the
cost of providing adversary ingredients is considerable. Judge
Friendly has suggested that "reasonable experimentation" with an
administrative law judge employing inquisitorial powers of investigation be undertaken in lieu of adversary decision making in some
mass justice situations. Both Judge Friendly and Professors Thibaut and Walker are searching for the "just decision"; 72 it is more
likely to be found if the experimentation advocated by the former
is undertaken along the lines discovered by the latter. With this
spirit of investigation firmly in mind, the following empirical survey
of informal adjudication procedures is offored.
II.

A

SURVEY OF INFORMAL ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES

Since there are so many different ways the federal government
adjudicates informally, the study, conducted in the summer of 1975,
was designed to reduce the observation process to manageable size.
In order to establish a controlled setting, four agencies were selected
for study in terms of four typical informal adjudication categories.
The agencies selected were the Departments of Agriculture (USDA),
70 Especially the attorney-representative ingredient. See note 60 supra.
"
'

Friendly, supra note 29, at 1289-91.
See id. at 1289; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 54, at 1-2.
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Commerce, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Interior.7 3 The categories selected were: (1) grants, benefits, loans, and
subsidies; (2) licensing, authorizing, and accrediting; (3) inspecting,
grading, and auditing; and (4) planning, policy making, and economic development. 4 The resulting "four-by-four" study was intended to permit comparison of intra- and interagency behavior in
75
informal adjudication.
The study focused on forty-two individual programs in the four
categories, with the bulk of the programs falling in the first two
categories. 76 The study of each program involved direct contact by
13The four agencies were selected after consideration of several factors. A review of their
statutory responsibilities disclosed a rich variety of informal procedural functions. An attempt was made to select agencies with programs both highly visible from a judicial review
standpoint (HUD and, to some extent, Interior), and relatively unnoticed (Agriculture and
Commerce), in order to get an idea of the extent to which Goldberg procedures were judicially,
as opposed to internally, inspired. An attempt was made to include agencies with longestablished programs (Agriculture and Interior) and with new responsibilities (Commerce-in
some respects-and HUD). Finally, it was thought best to stay away from Health, Education
and Welfare since that agency's programs have been the subject of considerable study already. See, e.g., D. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (1974); R.
DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE (1973).
11These categories were selected for several reasons. All of them involve programs that
utilize informal procedures (the first one, of course, contains the Goldberg program); and they
are suggestive of different degrees of conflict between the parties and the decision maker, and
different degrees of seriousness to the individual. It should be noted that the fourth category
does not involve programs normally associated with informal adjudication; nevertheless it is
believed that since the line between policy making and adjudication is often unclear, informal
procedural solutions relevant to policy making might be of value in suggesting procedures
appropriate for the more typical forms of adjudication.
11It should be noted that the characterization of these programs as adjudicative rests
on the assumption that the procedural ingredients remain constant as to all matters resolved
within a given program. This approach does not therefore, completely share Professor Davis's
view that trial-type procedural ingredients should be applied on a case-by-case basis depending upon the existence of disputed "adjudicative facts." See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 160-61 (3d ed. 1972). This difference in approach stems from the belief that such an
inquiry is often unavailing and that it is probably more reliable to identify particular programs as "adjudicative" or "legislative" at the outset and assume that the procedural ingredients are largely fixed for all purposes at that time. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20308 (1976). But in order to check the accuracy of that assumption, the survey asked the
relevant agency personnel whether the procedural ingredients contained in their regulations
varied when questions of disputed fact had to be resolved. The answer was uniformly negative. See note 77 infra, at 9. But see notes 102, 107, 134 infra. It should also be noted that
the procedural regulations studied did not generally designate summary judgment or other
expedited decision alternatives which would allow procedures automatically to vary according to the presence or absence of disputed issues of fact. Compare the Florida APA, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 120.57 (Supp. 1976-77), which provides for formal, trial-type proceedings when there
is a "disputed issue of material fact" and informal proceedings (notice, written comment, and
written explanation) in all other cases.
11 Seventeen programs fell within category one; twelve within category two; five within
category three; and six within category four. Two programs resisted categorization (USDA
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the author with responsible agency personnel, usually government
lawyers with backgrounds in the particular programs and their attendant procedures. Each contact person was provided with a written request for information (a procedural "checklist") which was
77
further explained in follow-ups both in person and by telephone.
As the data requested were received, they were compiled according
to the checklist paragraphs.78 From these compilations summaries
79
by program and by agency were produced.
One goal of this empirical phase was to determine how much
impact emerging notions of procedural due process were having
reparations procedures under the Packers and Stockyards Act, and Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act).
" An informal procedure checklist, dated June 10, 1975, asked for the following information:
1. description of the informal function and all procedural requirements relating to
it with references to relevant United States Code and Code of Federal Regulation citations, including any amendments or revisions in the last five years.
2. description of the agency personnel (number, rank, and education) assigned to
make the initial determinations.
3. number of individual transactions handled by assigned personnel for each function for the last five years with year by year totals.
4. percentage of individual transactions decided favorably to the claimant/
disputant.
5. costs associated with each transaction decided favorably or adversely to the
claimant/disputant.
6. description of each informal procedure function in terms of compliance with the
ten Goldberg ingredients described in text at note 80 infra.
7. extent to which the ingredients apply at the pretermination or preaction stage.
8. description of any alternative procedures developed to achieve purposes similar
to those outlined in Goldberg.
9. extent to which procedures vary when questions of "disputed fact" arise and a
description of the manner of procedural variance.
10. percentage of individual transactions decided adversely to the claimant/
disputant that were resolved short of the informal hearing stage.
11. description of any internal review mechanism (i.e., record? oral/written presentation?) and number of cases that reach that stage.
12. number of judicial appeals from adverse decisions under each function in the
last five years, year by year.
These inquiries were prepared by the author after consultation with the Informal Action
Committee and ACUS staff. They were "pretested" through preliminary discussions with the
Acting General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture. In each case the checklist was
administered personally by the author, and verbal descriptions supplemented the written
checklist. Respondents were also encouraged to telephone the author with questions, and
many such contacts were made throughout the data collection process.
7' Some agencies were not able to provide all of the information requested by the checklist for each of the programs despite follow-up efforts.
11These summaries were distributed in a memorandum dated Sept. 23, 1975 to the
Informal Action Committee. They contained information on the substance of each program
and its procedural ingredients. These summaries and their supporting data are on file with
the author.
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upon the process of informal adjudication. To measure this awareness more precisely, the individual procedural ingredients mandated in Goldberg were isolated and tabulated with respect to each
of the programs studied. Goldberg has been described as requiring
the following ten ingredients:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

timely and adequate notice;
confronting adverse witnesses;
oral presentation of arguments;
oral presentation of evidence;
cross-examination of adverse witnesses;
disclosure to the claimant of opposing evidence;
the right to retain an attorney;
a determination on the record of the hearing;
a statement of reasons for the determination and an indication of the evidence relied on; and
an impartial decision maker."

The survey data will be presented first by program in descending order of the number of Goldberg ingredients; then, after noting
some significant procedural innovations and other practices worthy
of comment, the data will be summarized and cross-tabulated.
A.

Presentation by Ingredients

The ten Goldberg procedural ingredients were present in their
entirety in only two of the forty-two programs studied. Both of these
programs are administered by the Department of Agriculture, and
involve category one (grants, benefits, loans, and subsidies). They
81See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970). The ten ingredients extracted from
Goldberg are substantially as identified by Professor Davis. See K. DAvis, supra note 5, at
288. Their enumeration is not uncontroversial, however. Professor Clark Byse, in discussions
with the author, has interpreted ingredient 6 to be of no independent vitality (i.e., as a
discovery device) but rather to be only the inevitable consequence of providing ingredients
3, 4, and 5. He would, therefore, find only nine Goldberg ingredients. This survey, however,
proceeds on the assumption that ingredient 6 has separate meaning as a discovery device,
and agency procedures will be measured against its requirements. For a quick overview, th
following statistical summary should be helpful. Of the forty-two programs studied, two
provided all ten Goldberg ingredients, five provided nine, two provided eight, four provided
seven, one provided six, one provided five, nine provided four, thirteen provided three, three
provided two, and two provided none. These totals were taken from operative procedural
regulations, which do not exist for the last two programs. See note 134 infra. Alternatively
stated, the summary by ingredient shows forty of the functions provided ingredient 1, ten
ingredient 2, twenty-one ingredient 3, twelve ingredient 4, nine ingredient 5, ten ingredient
6, sixteen ingredient 7, eight ingredient 8, thirty-seven ingredient 9, and thirty-eight ingredient 10.
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are disqualification of recipients under the food stamp program,8 '
and establishment of agricultural marketing quotas.12 Since the food
stamp program has social goals similar to the welfare program, it is
not surprising that the full Goldberg ingredients should be provided. 3 On the other hand, the other USDA program presents an
unexpectedly elaborate procedural mechanism. USDA currently
sets quotas for support payments to farmers who produce tobacco,
peanuts, and extra-long staple cotton. 4 These quotas are set initially by local county committees. Upon receiving notification of his
quota, a dissatisfied farmer has fifteen days to apply for review
before the local review committee, which is composed of three farmers appointed from the farmer's locality by the Secretary of Agriculture." The hearing before this committee contains the full Goldberg
1' Under section 4(a) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 2013 (1970), the Secretary
of Agriculture is authorized to formulate and administer a food stamp program at the request
of state agencies. The agencies submit plans of operation for approval, and, to be approved,
the state plan must provide a "fair hearing." Food Stamp Act § 10(e), 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e)
(1970). Regulations have been promulgated describing the fair hearing process, 7 C.F.R. §
271.1(o) (1976), and they are issued as part of the USDA Food Stamp Certification Handbook
1974, which is made available to state agencies. The regulations provide for an evidentiary
(Goldberg) hearing and an appeals review process (which may be substantial evidence or de
novo review, depending upon the claimant's request) at the state level before judicial review
can be sought in the federal court. 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(o)(9) (1976). Benefits are continued until
an adverse decision is rendered at the initial evidentiary hearing. 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(n)(4)
(1976). While the regulations also require the states to keep statistics on the number and
disposition of administrative appeals, this informaton had not been collected by the Department and is not available for statistical comparison. The food stamp program had some 18.8
million participants in October 1975, who received benefits of about $6 billion annually. See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, at 25, col. 1.
fi Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1363 (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 711 (1976).
One apparent distinction between welfare and food stamp administration is the fact
that the latter still appears to be largely a self-certification process. The Goldberg pretermination procedures, which caused HEW to switch from self-certification because of the difficulty
in removing those once certified from the rolls, have not resulted in a similar response from
USDA or the state agencies. The "low profile" of the food stamp program in many states may,
however, be an alternative means of keeping food stamp rolls under control. To offset this
lack of publicity, the USDA mandated an "Operation Outreach" program to require state
and local agencies to publicize the availability of food stamps. See The Washington Post, Oct.
1, 1975, § A, at 10, col. 1; cf. notes 150-51, 191 infra (discussion of EDA "low profile").
' A related program, containing nine procedural ingredients, is agency review of crop
subsidy program matters other than quota reviews. See 7 C.F.R. § 780 (1976) (containing all
the Goldberg ingredients except number 8-determination on the record). The Agricultural
Marketing and Stabilization Service has internal review jurisdiction over penalities for false
identification of crops or reductions in quotas determined initially by county committees. The
Deputy Director of ASCS has handled 1,399 of these informal appeals in the last five years,
mostly on briefs and memoranda from the parties. Judicial review of these decisions is limited
to questions of law. See Phillips v. Simpson, 353 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Ky. 1973); 7 U.S.C. §
1385 (1970).
'* 7 U.S.C. § 1363 (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 711 (1976) (committee's procedural regulations).
There are 754 members of review committees throughout the United States.
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ingredients.8 1 Judicial review of the committee's decision, based
upon the substantial evidence test, may be had within fifteen days
in the United States district court or a state court of record.87
Four programs, all administered by the Department of Agriculture, have procedures containing nine of the ten Goldberg ingredients.88 Two of the programs have every ingredient but number 8 (a
determination resting solely on the record of the hearing): repara8
tions proceedings under the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) 1
and under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA). 8
Both resist classification within the four categories of informal adjudication established at the outset. Essentially, the Department of
Agriculture exacts reparations for farmers injured by the unfair conduct of packers, stockyards, and dealers in perishable agricultural
commodities (fresh fruits and vegetables). The informal adjudication procedures established by the Department for making these
reparations decisions offer useful insights into the informal adjudication process. Of particular interest is the fact that the reparation
proceedings under both acts provide for a Goldberg-type (nine ingredient) oral hearing and a shortened procedure which is much
more summary in form." In addition the Department engages in an
informal settlement stage before either procedural route is undertaken. 2 Attorneys in the Department's Office of General Counsel
8, Although the local committees constitute'an impartial decision maker in the minimal
Goldberg sense, see note 48 supra, there are grounds for questioning their impartiality, since
the farmers are essentially regulating themselves by sitting in judgment of each other's
quotas. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Attempts are made to assure impartiality
by requiring that members of the review committee do not have any interest in the case before
the committee. The committees reverse about 36 percent of the original quota decisions. See
notes 207-08 infra.
87 7 U.S.C. §§ 1365-66 (1970). This system of quota review has involved an insignificant
number of cases over the last five years. Of the many thousands of quotas set during this
period, only 466 have been reviewed by the county committees. The USDA estimates that
each review costs $500, which is largely for a transcript, reporter, and per diem for committee
members.
A fifth nine-ingredient function is discussed at note 84 supra.
397 U.S.C. §§ 209-10 (1970).
907 U.S.C. §§ 499b, 499g (1970).
1, An oral hearing is available if any party requests it, except that under the PACA, the
complaint must exceed $3000 before an oral hearing can be sought. For procedural regulations, see 9 C.F.R. § 202.39-.60 (1976) (PSA); 7 C.F.R. § 47.6-.25 (1976) (PACA). The shortened procedure involves a complaint, answer, and evidence submitted in affidavit form (occasionally depositions are permitted). Briefs are served and cross-filed, and the hearing officer
renders a written decision subject to approval by the judicial officer. It has been estimated
by random sampling that PACA shortened procedure cases take ten months and oral hearing
cases eighteen months. According to PACA personnel, in many cases both sides prefer the
shortened procedure. See PACA memorandum to author (undated).
"1 In fiscal year 1974, for example, the Packers and Stockyards Administration disposed
of 595 complaints at the settlement stage; 38 cases were "docketed" for either oral hearing or
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are responsible for administering the reparation proceedings. They
first investigate all claims, conduct the oral or shortened hearings
at field offices, and prepare recommended decisions for the judicial
officer, 3 who reviews the transcript of the record and renders the
final agency decision." There does not appear to be any articulated
policy for excluding the Goldberg requirement for a determination
on the record from the otherwise elaborate oral hearings, unless it
is that the judicial officer who renders the final decision is not the
hearing officer and that the order itself is not directly reviewable15
The two other Department of Agriculture programs that provide nine of the Goldbergingredients are in the licensing and inspection categories: revocation or suspension of veterinary accreditations96 and withdrawal of approval of markets or facilities under the
animal quarantine laws. In both cases the missing procedural inshortened procedures, and of those, 16 were settled or dismissed by consent, 10 were dismissed
on the merits, and 16 resulted in reparation awards (4 had been pending from 1973). The
Packers and Stockyards Administration spent $112,000 in administering the reparation program. Complainants received $2,084,000 in undocketed consent settlements and $125,000 in
docketed settlements. The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act reparations are also
largely settled with 80 percent of all cases being disposed of before a formal complaint is filed
and 5 to 10 percent settled prior to the issuance of an order. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7463 (providing written procedures yielding nonreviewable determinations for cases involving deficiencies or overpayments not exceeding $1,500).
"3The judicial officer is not an administrative law judge, but a USDA attorney out of
the Office of General Counsel in Washington, D.C.
" The Department is not usually a party in any subsequent court actions.
,5 Judicial review of reparation orders is obtained by defending against a complainant's
civil suit for payment in the district court, where the reparation order is given prima facie
effect. 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970). There is no jurisdiction in the court of appeals for direct
review of a reparation order. Maly Livestock Comm'n Co. v. Hardin, 446 F.2d 4 (8th Cir.
1971).
" 9 C.F.R. §§ 160-62 (1976). The USDA veterinarian in charge determines initially
whether the veterinary standards were violated. The rules of practice specifically provide for
an informal conference between the veterinarian in charge and the accredited veterinarian. 9
C.F.R. § 162.1(d) (1976). Twenty per cent of all cases are disposed of at this conference stage.
In the last five years there have been ninety violation cases; five disputants had cases decided
in their favor, fifty-five were sent letters of warning, and thirty had their licenses revoked or
suspended after a Goldberg-type hearing. The hearing is conducted by a designated hearing
officer (an attorney in the Office of the General Counsel or in some cases an administrative
law judge, who submits a report and record to the Director of the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) for final decision. There has been one judicial appeal from these
final decisions in the last five years. APHIS memorandum to author, Sept. 3, 1975.
" 21 U.S.C. §§ 111-34 (1970); 9 C.F.R. §§ 76.18(b), 78.25(c) (1976). Under the Horse
Protection Act the Department approves livestock markets, stockyards, slaughtering establishments, and quarantine facilities and withdraws approval if inspections show a violation
of the established standards. These inspections are coordinated by a USDA veterinarian, but
the inspections themselves are usually conducted by USDA accredited veterinarians from
private practice, who can have their accreditation suspended or revoked for failure to comply
with the appropriate USDA inspection standards. See Standards for Accredited Veterinari-
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gredient is number six, disclosure to claimant of opposing evidence,
which is precluded by explicit department policy. 8
There were two programs with eight Goldberg ingredients: debarring of "responsibly connected" employees of licensees who violate the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act from future employment with PACA licensees, a procedure that omits ingredients
2 (confrontation) and 5 (cross-examination);" and issuing permits
under the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act,' 0 a Commerce program
that omits ingredients 6 (disclosure of opposing evidence) and 8
(determination on the record). The "responsibly connected" debarment determination has for a long time been made by the Chief of
the Regulatory Branch of the Fruit and Vegetable Division, USDA,
without any established procedural regulations. Nonetheless, in the

ans, 9 C.F.R. § 161.2 (1976). Approved facilities are inspected periodically by the accredited
veterinarians who, when they find deficiencies, explain them to the livestock managers or
facility owners and offer an opportunity to correct them. Ninety-five per cent of the inspection
violations are corrected in this low cost, nonadversary fashion. USDA estimates each of these
inspections costs the government $100 to $150. The remaining violations are handled as
follows: The facility is given a written notice of noncompliance, with the opportunity to
comply or contest within thirty days. Assuming a factual contest over the inspector's report,
the Deputy Administrator of APHIS provides a Goldberg-type hearing (minus ingredient 6).
In the last five years, twenty-five complaints have been handled in this fashion, and ten
withdrawls of approval have occurred, none of which resulted in judicial appeals. The inspection process remains the primary means of ensuring compliance with the Act.
*8 APHIS memorandum to author, Sept. 3, 1975.
" See 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1970). Under PACA a "responsibly connected" person is
defined as one "affiliated or connected with a commission merchant, dealer, or broker as (A)
partner in a partnership, or (B) officer, director, or holder of more than 10 per centum of the
outstanding stock of a corporation." 7 U.S.C. § 499a(9) (1970). In addition, the USDA has
recently been granted the authority to negotiate settlements with PACA licensees who admit
to a violation of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 499(b)(5) (1974) provides:
That any commission merchant, dealer or broker who has violated this subsection may,
with the consent of the Secretary, admit the violation or violations and pay a monetary
penalty not to exceed $2000 in lieu of a formal proceeding for the suspension or revocation of license ....
The law contains no procedures for implementation. The Deputy Director, Fruit and Vegetable Division, USDA, who will administer this provision, expects that about twenty-five cases
a year will arise under it. There are no procedures fixed by regulation, but the Deputy Director
intends to engage in negotiations which will have procedures that include Goldberg ingredients 1 (notice-of settlement offer with suggested penalty amount), 2 (disclosure of evidence-of the violation), 7 (right to retain attorney during settlement negotiations), and 9 (a
statement of reasons). The Deputy Director, since he is the instigator of and a party to the
negotiations, does not consider himself an impartial decision maker. PACA memorandum to
author (undated).
110See Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. §§ l100b to l100b-7 (1975); 50
C.F.R. § 245.11 (1975). Under the Act the Secretary is authorized to issue up to 325 annual
permits for United States-owned vessels to carry on shrimp fishing in the vicinity of Brazil
(boundaries having been declared under a prior treaty agreement). 16 U.S.C. § 1100b-1(a)
(1975). No denials, revocations, or suspensions of permits have yet occurred under this Act.
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cases where the initial determination is questioned,'"' the division
provides the debarred employee with an informal hearing containing each of the Goldbergingredients except confrontation and crossexamination.' 2 Recently, however, the division's procedures for determining who is a "responsible employee" have come under judicial scrutiny, and significant changes may be necessary in the fu03
ture.
Four programs operated under procedures with seven of the
Goldberg ingredients: removal of grain inspectors' licenses under
the United States Grain Standards Act' 4 (a USDA function); de"' The division estimates that fifty persons have questioned their status as responsibly
connected employees in the last five years; on 50 percent of those occasions (twenty-five
times) the questioning resulted in a changed ruling by the chief of the division favorable to
the employee. In the remaining twenty-five cases, the eight-ingredient Goldberg hearing
discussed in the text has been provided. There have been five judicial appeals from these
twenty-five final rulings in the last five years. The most significant appeal from a procedural
standpoint is discussed in note 103 infra.
"I2The division claims that, although confrontation and cross-examination are not permitted, "to date no situation has arisen in which such a procedure has been necessary."
PACA memorandum to author (undated).
'1 In Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court construed the section of
the Act defining "responsibly connected employee," see note 99 supra, as not creating an
irrebutable presumption against an officer of a violating corporate licensee. The court emphasized that when evidence is offered on whether an officer is a responsibly connected employee,
"the opportunity of proof must be accorded, and the issue must be resolved on the evidence."
Id. at 756. While the court did not specifically enumerate the ingredients necessary in such a
hearing, one can anticipate that the USDA's current policy denying confrontation and crossexamination in "responsibly connected" cases could be held an intrusion upon the individual's right to offer proof on the issue. However, the PACA division chief anticipates that no
more than one challenge a year to the "officer" interpretation will get to the agency review
stage. PACA memorandum to author (undated).
,017 U.S.C. §§ 71-87h (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 26.101 (1976). Under the Act and regulations,
all grain sold, offered for sale, or consigned for sale by grade in foreign commerce must be
officially inspected as the grain is being loaded on the final carrier for transportation abroad.
The Act also provides for the voluntary inspection and grading of grain to be sold in interstate
commerce. The grain inspections are carried out by USDA-licensed private inspection agencies, and in some cases by state inspection agencies. Licensed grain inspectors are entitled
to a hearing before their licenses can be suspended, revoked, or not renewed. 7 U.S.C. §§ 8586 (1970). But the Act goes on to provide the licensee with the choice of an informal or formal
(administrative law judge) hearing. 7 U.S.C. § 87e (1970), provides:
[Piroceedings under section 85 or 86. . . shall not, unless requested by the respondent,
be subject to the administrative procedure provisions in sections 554, 556 and 557 of Title
5.
This unique "procedural option," which was offered in theory by statute in 1968, did not
become a reality until 1974 when the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of USDA proposed and adopted informal procedural rules. See Rules of Practice, 7 C.F.R. §§ 26.2001-.2016
(1976). From 1968 to 1974 all licensing proceedings were formal APA hearings since no informal rules had been enacted. The informal rules were promulgated on July 8, 1974 after the
Service engaged in informal rulemaking proceedings to determine the public's views. Since
July 1974 four informal proceedings have commenced; three resulted in respondent default;
and the fourth has not been completed. AMS memorandum to author, July 31, 1975.
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barment of lender-builders, appraisers, and attorneys under the
Federal Housing Administration'0 5 (HUD); issuance of permits
under the Antiquity Act'0 ' (Interior); and grants and loans by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' 7 (Interior). The first program fails to proThe informal proceeding is conducted by a hearing officer who makes written decisions
that become final when approved by the Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service.
This switch from an administrative law judge to a hearing officer was a main aspect of the
Service's effort "to expedite the proceeding"; its experience in this regard deserves close
watching. See 39 Fed. Reg. 25050 (1974) (comments of AMS). The denial of discovery and
oral argument are two other attempts to expedite proceedings. Since the experience is so
limited, it will take a while to evaluate the time and cost effectiveness of the informal
alternative. AMS's current estimates of costs, however, are that they will not vary much from
the costs of administrative law judge proceedings.
Licensed grain inspectors at the Port of New Orleans have become the subjects of criminal proceedings for alleged shortweighting and bribery. See The Washington Post, Nov. 28,
1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. Those proceedings are not included within this study, but they may in
the long run have an impact on the USDA licensing process.
"I HUD is authorized to debar lender/builders, appraisers, or attorneys from government
lending programs if they have violated criminal statutes, the equal employment opportunity
executive order, or the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or for other causes of a serious and compelling
nature. The procedural regulations provide for an informal hearing before a hearing officer
(an attorney from a six-member panel selected by HUD's General Counsel). 24 C.F.R. § 24.10
(1974). The disputant makes an oral presentation, and the hearing officer writes an opinion
which becomes final unless revised or modified by the Assistant Secretary. A debarred individual may request reinstatement after six months. At this "rehearing" the same procedures
apply except the first hearing officer is replaced by the program director. See 12 U.S.C. §
1731a (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 24.10(b)(4) (1974).
'- 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1970); 43 C.F.R. § 3 (1975). The regulation prohibits the removal of
"any object of antiquity" (a man-made object over 100 years old) from federal lands without
a permit. The regulation also applies to examination of ruins and excavation of archeological
sites (such as the search for Spanish galleons on the outer continental shelf). The permit
process is administered by a departmental Ph.D. archeologist. Informal oral or written presentations are allowed, and applications for permits by qualified archeologists are rarely denied.
,o7See Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-543 (1974); 25 C.F.R. §§ 80, 91,
93 (1974). The Division of Financial Assistance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) administers several grant and loan programs: the Indian Business Development program (nonreimbursable grants made to stimulate Indian entrepreneurship and employment), 25 C.F.R. §
80 (1975); the revolving loan fund program, 25 C.F.R. § 91 (1975); and the loan guaranty,
insurance, and interest subsidy program, 25 C.F.R. § 93 (1975). These programs have resulted
in awards to Indians of over $325 million in the last five years. Since 1971 the Bureau has
made 17,723 supervised loans, totaling $42 million; 97,661 assisted commercial loans, totaling
$100 million; and 6,726 other assisted federal loans, totaling $185 million.
Initially, the programs consist of notice, application, evaluation, determination, and
explanation stages that are carried out by area BIA superintendants. Notice of program
availability is a particularly crucial aspect of the initial procedures since it is the step that
largely determines the quality of the applications. This is especially true for the Indian
Business Development program. Currently notice is provided at the BIA administrative offices located on each reservation. While this notice may not automatically reach all of the
potential applicants, BIA officials believe that such information travels with alacrity throughout the Indian community. Presumably this kind of tribal communication system is not
present in other more geographically and politically diverse constituencies.
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vide ingredients 3 (oral argument),'"" 6 (disclosure of opposing evidence), and 10 (impartial decision maker);' 9 the second fails to
provide 2 (confrontation), 5 (cross-examination), and 6 (disclosure
of opposing evidence); the third also omits ingredients 2, 5, and 8;
and the fourth omits ingredients 2, 4 (oral presentation of evidence),
and 5.
One program has procedures with six Goldberg ingredients.
Retailer disqualification under the food stamp program"0 is a USDA
function that'omits ingredients 2 (confrontation), 4 (oral presentation of evidence), 5 (cross-examination), and 8 (determination on
the record). Retailers may be disqualified under the Food Stamp
Act for irregularities such as selling ineligible items or discounting
stamps for cash. The disqualifications can be for up to three years.''
It should be noted that the procedures for retailer disqualifications
are considerably less formal than for disqualifications of food stamp
recipients." ' 2 The decisions are made by a single official (the Chief,
Retailer-Wholesaler Branch, Food Stamp Division) in an effort, according to USDA, to obtain uniformity of treatment for retailers
throughout the nation. This official reviews case summaries from
local officials who collect information, issue notices of charges, and
allow the retailer and his counsel to make an oral and written explanation of the charge. The retailer is entitled to administrative
review of any order of disqualification.113 Approximately 49 percent
of the retailers seek this review, which represents the final agency
Disappointed applicants are entitled to internal review through the recently created
Board of Indian Appeals, which provides the seven Goldberg ingredients noted in the text.
In addition, the Board, if it feels the need to do so, can assign an administrative law judge to
resolve matters involving genuine issues of material fact. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.415 (1975). The
Board estimates that such discretionary fact hearings are ordered in less than 1 percent of
the appeals that come before it. In Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1976), a denial of
oral hearing was successfully attacked on due process grounds, and the Secretary was ordered
to develop regulations providing for an oral hearing. BIA officials observe that most of the
disappointed applicants either line up for grants and loans the following year or pursue their
cases directly through congressional channels.
'' Written comments are permitted, however.
,0,
This is the agency's own characterization made apparently because of the belief that
failure to provide an administrative law judge as the decision maker destroys impartiality.
This study follows Goldberg in not requiring administrative law judges for impartiality. See
note 45 supra.
,, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020-22 (1973).
' 7 C.F.R. § 272.6(a) (1976). During the five year period 1970 to 1974, 1,904 determinations to disqualify were made, and 2,359 lesser actions (usually warning letters) were taken.
112See text and note at note 81 supra.
" 7 C.F.R. § 273 (1976). These proceedings take place before the food stamp review
officer in Washington. This review may include an oral appearance by the retailer or his
representative; in addition, the retailer may request the review officer personally to inspect
his store.
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decision. In the last five years 182 retailers have sought judicial
review.
One program had five Goldberg ingredients: leasing of oil, gas,
and coal deposits."' The program is in the Department of the Interior and has an informal procedure with ingredients 1, 6, 7, 9, and
10.
Over one-half of the forty-two programs studied (twenty-two)
provided procedures with either four or three of the Goldberg ingredients. Of the nine programs with four ingredients, all but one ' ,5 had
ingredients 1, 3, 9, and 10; of the thirteen programs with three
ingredients, all had ingredients 1, 9, and 10. Thus the distinction
between eight of the nine four-ingredient programs and the thirteen
three-ingredient programs is the addition of oral argument (ingredient 3) to the minimal adversary informal procedures of notice, a
statement of reasons, and an impartial decision maker." 6 The eight
four-ingredient programs are: loans by the Farmers Home
Administration"7 (USDA); public works grants,' business development loans,"' and technical assistance grants'20 by the Economic
Development Administration (Commerce); financial guarantees to
" See 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1970) (oil and gas); 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1970) (coal).
I's The one exception is PACA negotiation procedures (ingredients 1, 2, 7, and 9), which
is discussed at note 99 supra.
I The fact that there is no oral argument (ingredient 3) does not mean that there is no
right to submit written memoranda and argunients. Of the thirteen three-ingredient programs, four include a right to submit written comments. Thus they meet the informal adjudication minimum discussed earlier.
"1 7 U.S.C. § 1989 (1970); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1801.1-.6 (1976). Certain Farmers Home Administration programs (rural housing loans) listed in 7 C.F.R. § 1822 (1976) are excluded from these
informal procedures. However, agency personnel in charge state that "full explanation and
informal review" are available even in those programs. Farmers Home Administration memorandum to author, July 3, 1975. From 1947 through 1974 the Farmers Home Administration
made 1,989,120 direct, insured, and guaranteed farm operating loans in the total amount of
$6,135,494,170. In Hilbum v. Butz, 463 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1972), the court held that despite
Goldberg, no hearing was required prior to a reduction in Farmers Home Administration in
program benefits. But in Ponce v. Housing Authority, 389 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Cal. 1975), the
court required certain informal procedures before permitting rent increases in low rent farm
labor housing projects funded by the Farmers Home Administration. The court required
several Goldberg ingredients (timely notice, review of written evidence, written comments,
concise statement of reasons, and impartial decision maker), but excluded others (oral presentation of evidence, confrontation, and cross-examination). In these procedural choices, the
court followed the decisions under HUD housing programs. See note 127 infra.
I's 42 U.S.C. §§ 3131-36 (1970). About $200 million in public works grants were awarded
in fiscal 1975. The awards are made within certain areas which are designated by EDA as
"economic development districts."
1"I42 U.S.C. § 3142 (1974). About $23 million in business development loans were
awarded by EDA in fiscal 1975.
120 42 U.S.C. § 3151 (1970). About $25 million in technical assistance grants were
awarded by EDA in fiscal 1975.
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developers of new communities 2 1 (HUD); establishment of estuarine sanctuaries' 2 (Commerce); master planning for new parks'2
(Interior); and planning for outer continental shelf oil and gas leasing'2 4 (Interior). The thirteen three-ingredient programs include
seven programs within the Department of Commerce;' 25 three
within the Department of the Interior;2 6 and three within HUD.'2
12142

U.S.C. § 4514(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
'- 16 U.S.C. § 1461 (1972); 15 C.F.R. § 921 (1976). Under this program the agency is to
create natural field laboratories within the estuaries of the coastal zone. Notice of program
availability follows the "advertised public hearing" requirement of NEPA. 15 C.F.R. §
921.11(d)(10)(i) (1976).
I= 16 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Master planning involves many people in the Park Service; they
prepare a draft plan and a draft environmental impact statement and make them avaiable
for public comment. It is estimated that the Yosemite National Park Master Plan will cost
$500,000 before it is finished.
"I See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § § 1331-43 (1970); 30 C.F.R.
§ 250 (1975).
12 They are: (1) reimbursements under the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1970) (during 1969-76, $3.5 million in claims have been paid); (2) loans to fishermen
under section 4 of the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) (1,282 loans have
been awarded totalling $32.3 million); (3) agreements for capital construction funds under
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970) (over the program's life, 706
agreements have been issued totalling $345 million); (4) guarantees under the fishing vessel
guarantee program, 46 U.S.C. § 1271 (1970); 50 C.F.R. § 255 (1975) (322 guarantees totalling
$40.8 million through 1972); (5) grants for conservation research and developmemt of fishing
resources, under the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 757a (1970); 50 C.F.R.
§ 401 (1975) (in fiscal 1975, 40 grants for $2 million), and the Commercial Fisheries Research
and Development Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 779 (1970); 50 C.F.R. § 253 (1975) (in 1975, 125
grants for $3.8 million); (6) grants under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1455 (1972); and (7) planning grants under the same act, 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1972); 15 C.F.R.
§ 923 (1976).
"' They are: (1) grants to individuals under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972,
16 U.S.C. § 1380 (1972); 40 Fed. Reg. 23281 (1975). (Most requests for research grants are
handled at a preapplication stage.) (2) Permits issued under the Marine Mammal Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1374 (1972), and under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1973).
50 C.F.R. §§ 14-18 (1975). (The Acts allow the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service to
issue permits for scientific purposes, public display, or propagation of protected species. The
permit process is in part conducted on the basis of negotiations and conferences. In the last
five years 517 Endangered Species Act and 18 Marine Mammal Act permits have been issued,
representing in each case favorable action on about 93 percent of the permit requests under
each Act. The Service estimates that each application costs $653 to administer. Of the 7
percent denials, only 1 percent seek internal review before the Director, and only one judicial
action-which resulted in dismissal-has been recorded in the last five years.) (3) Permits
issued by the Park Service for public use of the national parks, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.6 (1975). (The Park Service sets the "carrying capacity" for national park areas through
the use of section 553 informal rulemaking. Notice of proposed capacity determinations is
provided to a broad class of persons in several ways. Notice is typically given to interested
groups like hiking clubs, as well as to the general public through official publications and
general circulation newspapers and magazines.)
227 They are: rent increases for tenants in subsidized housing, 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (1970);
grants under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1974);
and comprehensive planning under the Housing Act of 1954, 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1970); 24 C.F.R.
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The preponderance of these three- and four-ingredient programs is in the categories of grants and benefits or planning and
policymaking. 28 Each of the four agencies studied has programs
within these classifications, with Commerce the leader at eleven
programs.
Three programs surveyed provided procedures with two of the
Goldberg ingredients; in each case those ingredients are I (notice)
and 10 (impartial decision maker). These programs are auditing of
money grants for outdoor recreation 9 (Interior); voluntary inspection of fish products' (Commerce); and inspection for lead base
paint and structural defects in public housing 3 ' (HUD). Since each
program involves inspections, it is not surprising that the adversary
32
procedural ingredients are held to a minimum.
The two remaining programs have no designated procedures,
§ 600 (1975). Procedures for termination of block grants are formal APA proceedings. See 24
C.F.R. § 570.913 (1975). The HUD rent increase proceedings have been the subject of much
litigation. See note 36 supra. HUD procedures require thirty days written notice of proposed
increases placed "conspicuously" at the housing project; the tenants may submit written
comments to the local housing authority (LHA); the LHA then submits a written request to
HUD with the comments attached. HUD makes its determination and furnishes a statement
to the LHA in writing with reasons, at which point the LHA posts this statement in the same
conspicuous place for an additional thirty days. See 24 C.F.R. § 410 (1975).
,"' Nineteen of the twenty-two programs are within these two categories; three are within
the licensing category.
'12 See Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11
(1970). The purpose of this program is to oversee the accounting practices of the federal and
state agencies that implement the grants and financial assistance programs of the Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation. The grants provide for 50 percent reimbursement of allowable costs. The
states submit vouchers showing actual expenditures which the Bureau auditors review to
ensure that the costs are reasonable and within the grant contract. There are ten auditors
who review slightly over 2,000 contracts per year. The auditors cost $270,000 per year, making
each audit cost approximately $135. About 5 percent of the audit conclusions are challenged,
and these challenges are handled informally within the Bureau on the audit record.
'- 16 U.S.C. § 742d (1970). The Department of Commerce administers a voluntary fish
inspection program whereby processors of fish products can obtain an inspection and grading
mark (much like USDA meat inspection marks) that certifies the cleanliness of the processing
operation and the quality of the fish. Fish processors apply for an inspection of their facilities
to an inspection field office. If the facility meets the stated requirements, an inspection
certificate is issued. The applicant may appeal an initial denial of a certificate by asking for
a reinspection by a different inspector. 50 C.F.R. § 260 (1975). No hearings have ever been
held under this program.
'31 HUD enforces regulations that prohibit the use of lead base paint in federally funded
structures. 24 C.F.R. § 35 (1974). The local HUD staff or the project managing agent inspects
the property by taking paint samples from selected dwelling units. Testing is designed to show
that the lead in the paint does not exceed the allowable limit of 1 percent by weight. If the
inspection reveals an excessive amount of lead, measures are taken immediately to remove
the hazard. No hearing is provided on the issue, and no requests for review have been recorded
by HUD.
"3'See p. 753 supra.
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and for the purposes of this study they are categorized as having
none of the Goldberg ingredients.'33 Both these programs are in the
Department of Agriculture: meat and poultry inspections and plant
34
quarantine certifications.'
B.

Specific Procedural Observations

The survey also revealed a number of agency practices not limited to particular programs that significantly affect the quality of
informal adjudication and warrant special mention. Two of these
practices relate to recent reforms adopted by the Department of the
Interior, and two apply specifically to control of access to programs
in the grant and benefit category.
The first practice uncovered by the survey that should be noted
concerns an internal procedural refinement in the Interior Department. As a result of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,'11 environmental impact statements are required of proposed federal actions that may have a substantial effect
on the environment. Frequently, however, agencies cannot tell at
the outset whether the proposed action will or will not require an
environmental impact statement. Interior, which has many functions that affect the environment in some way, has sought to develop internal procedures for predicting the environmental and social impact of all major programs. The Department has developed
3 There are, in addition, some grant programs of the Farmers Home Administration
that are without Goldberg ingredients, but these programs have been included within another
program that includes certain Goldberg ingredients. See note 117 supra.
' See APHIS memorandum to author, Sept. 3, 1975. These programs are administered
by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The regulations contemplate
procedures for the cancellation of certificates for noncompliance with quarantine orders and
other prohibitory regulations. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 301.38-4 to .38-5, 301.45-4 to .45-5 (1976)
(promulgated under the Plant Quarantine Act and the Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
147a to 149 (1970). But since no procedures for these cancellation proceedings have been
established, this function is listed as having no Goldberg ingredients. Although the Director
of APHIS has cancelled one or two permits in the last five years based upon written reports
of field inspectors, he offers the assurance that "if a dispute arose with respect to a material
fact, a due process hearing would be provided in accordance with published rules of practice
applicable to other actions." APHIS memorandum to author, Sept. 3, 1975. The Director of
APHIS takes a similar stance with respect to meat and poultry inspection programs under
the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 620, 621, 623(b) (1970), the Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 464(e) (1970), and the voluntary inspection service for meat,
poultry, and other agricultural products, 7 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970). No proceedings have been
commenced under these sections in the last five years. APHIS memorandum to author, Sept.
3, 1975. Since in both programs the choice of procedures remains within the sole discretion
of the Director and no procedures have ever been implemented, these programs are tabulated
as having none of the Goldberg ingredients for the purposes of this survey.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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a program decision option document that is "designed to ensure
timely and systematic consideration of all environmental programs,
economic, social and other aspects of critical decisions."' 3 The purpose of the document is to decide initially whether an environmental impact statement must be prepared. But the effect of the process
is to provide a self-imposed procedural hard look at all aspects of
important decisions. The option document has the potential to become a rigorous internal control on the arbitrariness of nonadversary
decision making.'37 Seen in this light, the document is an additional
procedural ingredient that might be used to offset the apparent lack
of adversary procedures in many agency functions. 38 The reality of
this observation depends, of course, on the extent to which the
agency's various bureaus and offices are willing and required to
respond to the careful examination contemplated by the option document and environmental impact statement process." 9
Another recent development in the Department of the Interior
that deserves special mention is the Office of Hearings and Appeals,
created in 1970. The Office, with operating appeals branches (e.g.,
Board of Land Appeals, Board of Indian Appeals, and Board of
Contract Appeals), took over the internal review function from the
Department Solicitor's office. "' The boards are staffed by attorneys,
designated administrative judges,' who sit in panels of three and
"I Department of the Interior, Department Manual,

Part 301.1.1 (1972).
No particular format for the option document is required, but suggestions advanced
by the advocates of decision theory could facilitate its implementation. See text and notes
at note 28 supra & note 222 infra. The Department Manual has this to say about the document's contents:
No standard format is prescribed as the nature of the issue addressed in each environmental impact statement will determine the content and form of the related decision
option document-which may well be unique. Depending upon that issue, the supporting decision option document may have to address economic, political, or social values,
implications for or alternatives to policy or political, economic, or social institutions, or
implications for programs or budgets. Upon recommendation of such need . . .the
Assistant Secretary-Program Policy will arrange for consultations to develop the approaches and responsibilities appropriate to the particular program decision.
"I Since many of the HUD functions involve important environmental, social and economic issues, it is one of many agencies that would benefit from this kind of internal procedure.
'3' See generally Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
"' See 43 C.F.R. 4.1-.913 (1975). See generally Day, Administrative Procedures in the
Department of the Interior: The Role of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, 17 ROCKY MT.
MINERAL L. INST. 1 (1972). Despite the fact that the reform occurred in 1970, the year of the
Goldberg decision, the inspiration for reform appears to have been not that case, but mounting congressional pressure to establish an independent agency responsible for all decisions
concerning uses of and claims on public lands.
"I These are not to be confused with administrative law judges, who are reserved for
formal APA decision making or for occasional discretionary fact hearings. See 5 U.S.C. §
556(b) (1970).
117
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review initial decisions based on the record of the informal decisions
below, supported by written briefs and memoranda.4 2 The decisions
of the boards are final unless the Secretary exercises supervisory
jurisdiction,13 which has rarely been invoked. This informal review
process is the product of the Department's desire to create a more
impartial and thorough review of initial informal action without
sacrificing the efficiency of the former Solicitor review process.'"
A third practice revealed in the survey that warrants further
discussion relates to the variable quality of the notice ingredient in
grant and benefit programs. Notice of program availability is obviously of critical importance in the granting process, where notice
is the way applications are generated. In some circumstances the
scope of the grant, loan, or guarantee is limited to a class of beneficiaries who might be expected to be generally aware of the program's
existence. Thus specific notice of program availability is said to
travel fast in the Indian community.' Farmers ' and to some extent fishermen' might be expected to fall within a similar class of
aware grant and loan beneficiaries, as might specific groups like
scholars. 48 Similarly, grants and loans to states could reasonably
presuppose beneficiaries who are attuned to program availability.'
"I2
On occasion oral argument is permitted by the board as well. Frequently the initial
panel circulates important cases to the seven or eight members of the board for their comments on the decision. This amounts to a kind of informal en banc process that allows
important policy decisions to be ventilated within the board. See generally text and notes at
notes 203-06 infra.
"' 43 C.F.R. § 4.5 (1975).
"I The avowed purpose of the 1970 Interior reorganization was to eliminate the "fusion
of functions" that resulted from the Solicitor performing investigating, prosecuting, and
review roles. The Solicitor, in a memorandum letter on reorganization to the Secretary observed: "We agree that a procedural system should be isolated from and insulated against
institutional bias and influence. For this reason the Board of Contract Appeals was recently
removed from the Solicitor's office to the Secretary's office, and the same reasoning should
apply to all hearing examiners and appellate boards." Memorandum from Mitchell Melich,
Solicitor to Walter J. Hickel, Secretary, Feb. 4, 1970.
243 See note 107 supra.
", Farmers Home Administration loans are clearly of such long standing that their
availability is something farmers have learned to expect.
"47Fishermen eligible for the older Commerce Department programs, see note 125 supra,
like farmers, may be aware of their availability; in newer programs, under the Coastal Zone
Management Act, for example, knowledge of such availability probably should not be presumed.
"' Research grants administered by such institutions as the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Health are directed at a select and highly aware scholarly
community. One would think that any academician who did not take care to discover the
availability of grant funds is not worthy of his professional status; "grantsmanship" is common parlance in the academic community.
"IPublic works grants and grants under the Coastal Zone Management Act are princi-
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When it comes to generally available grants and benefits to a
nonselect, ill-defined, and potentially national constituency, however, the quality of the notice ingredient becomes a crucial aspect
of substantive and procedural goals. The danger is that a grant
program with broad social purposes will be frustrated if the notice
of its availability is so limited as effectively to limit the beneficiaries
to a few Washington-connected cognoscenti. If this occurs, the program itself can be unintentionally transformed from broad social
benefit legislation into narrow special interest legislation. There is
some suggestion of this in the policy of the Economic Development
Administration (EDA) in its administration of public works grants,
business loans and technical assistance grants. The EDA has a conscious policy of "low profiling" the availability of its grants to reduce the number of disappointed applicants and to expedite the
granting process.' Currently the EDA's notice of availability consists of pamphlets handed out by regional and state Economic Development Representatives (EDRs), but it is largely up to the public
5
to make the initial contacts with the EDRs.1 1
The second notable practice employed by the examined agencies in grant and benefit programs is the use of a preapplication
stage, whereby the agency representatives confer with interested
applicants to sharpen, direct, or discourage the forthcoming applications. This conference technique reduces the number of meritless
applications and the level of frustration attendant upon otherwise
impersonal and uninformative denials.1 52 In the case of the EDA,
however, the preapplication stage, while it reduces the number of
pally awarded to state or other public bodies whose access to the granting process is generally
assured by their continuing relationship with federal granting institutions. Undoubtedly, the
states are or should be sophisticated enough to obtain assistance in processing grants.
" These reasons were stated by the EDA in a letter to the author, Aug. 5, 1975. The
Raleigh EDR indicated his office was as "quiet as we can be." The low profile policy was
confirmed in interviews with the Atlanta EDR regional office. Interviews with Raleigh state
representative, July 29, 1975, and Atlanta regional office, Aug. 5, 1975. The first reason for
low profiling was explained by the desire not to generate too many "good proposals" for the
limited grant and loan funds that are available in any year. Certainly more good applications
would make choices between applicants harder, but the hard choices would probably produce
a better utilization of program funds. To some extent the second reason, expedition, is based
on the need to expend all available funds within a given fiscal year. This pressure may be
somewhat reduced after fiscal 1976 if, as expected, EDA gains granting approval for a threeyear period.
I The EDR relies principally on political contacts within the state to generate grant and
loan guarantee proposals. Interviews with Raleigh state representative, July 29, 1975, and
Atlanta regional office, Aug. 5, 1975.
12 HUD's administrator of guarantees for developers of new communities estimates that
about 200 inquiries are received per year, that between 20 to 60 go through the preapplication
stage and that 6 to 10 become final applications for guarantee assistance.
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formal applications'5 3 and thereby the number of ultimate denials,
also serves further to limit the availability of grants under the programs. As the program administrators admit, former practice
yielded applications for up to ten times the number of fundable
projects. Full explanation at threshold meetings discourages applications in several ways. For one thing, a display of government "red
tape" in the application process will discourage many. For another,
this stage occasionally allows promising applications to be selectively deferred to subsequent years if they cannot be awarded right
away.'54 While this latter tendency is understandable and undoubtedly efficient in some ways, it also has the effect of stacking up
applications and thereby reducing the need for new applications in
the future. To the extent that this occurs in the EDA grant process,
it serves to reinforce the EDA's general policy of "low profiling"
program availability and raises more questions about the efficacy of
that practice.
C.

Data Summaries and Cross-Tabulations

There are several other ways of looking at the collected data to
facilitate further analysis. Looking at the procedures and programs
studied across the four agencies offers some interesting institutional
contrasts. The Department of Agriculture, one of the least visible
agencies from a judicial review standpoint,'55 had, on the one hand,
programs that utilized the most elaborate, and, on the other hand,
programs that utilized the least demanding, procedural ingredients.
Of the fourteen USDA programs studied, ten had procedures with
six or more ingredients, two had four, and two, none.' 6 Part of the
reason for this unevenness in procedures is undoubtedly the failure
of USDA to promulgate procedural regulations' 57 in several cases.
'' The Commerce Department Office of Business Development estimates that there were
855 preapplication conferences in the fiscal year periods 1970 to 1974, of which 285 became
formal applications; of these formal applications, 38 were ultimately denied. Thus 87 percent
of all applications were granted during the last five years. The public works program does
not keep total grant application figures, but officials estimate that 250 grants are issued per
year.
,5, Conferences with the Raleigh EDR and the Atlanta EDR regional office revealed that
this practice was being employed on occasion. Interviews with Raleigh state representative,
July 29, 1975, and Atlanta regional office, Aug. 5, 1975.
'' During the five years since Goldberg (the period of this survey), there have been at
least three decisions in the federal courts involving USDA informal procedures. See notes 103,
117 supra.
"' Each of the seven programs with ten and nine procedural ingredients is within USDA;
in addition, USDA has single programs with eight, seven, and six ingredients, and two with
four.
'' See note 134 supra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:739

Nonetheless, of the four agencies studied, USDA's informal adjudication procedures are the most "formal" in the Goldberg sense. The
Department of Commerce had perhaps the most evenly distributed
informal adjudication ingredients. Of the thirteen Commerce programs studied, eleven had procedures with the standard three or
four ingredients. 5 ' This procedural consistency is notable since the
Office of General Counsel in Commerce, unlike that in Agriculture,
lacks central control over each of the Department's divisions and
offices.' 9 The Department of the Interior is clearly the most innovative of the four agencies when it comes to designing new procedures
for informal adjudication. The nine Interior programs studied offered procedures with a wide variety of Goldberg ingredients,' but
there were additional elements of informal decision making, such as
a revised informal review mechanism and a program decision option
document, that tended to regularize the formal adjudication process
in other ways. The fact that Interior has a Solicitor's office with
central control over procedural decisions within the various operating bureaus may have contributed to the recent innovations.16' The
fourth agency studied, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, appeared to be lacking most in central control by the
General Counsel's office. As a result, the procedures surrounding its
six programs were difficult to locate and their effect was difficult to
comprehend.' Since HUD is an agency with highly visible programs, it may be that the agency is as an initial matter leaving some
of the formulation of informal procedures to the courts.'63
"IEach of these eleven programs involved grants or benefits (eight) or planning and
policy making (three). In addition Commerce had one program with eight ingredients and
one with two.
1"9 In addition to an Office of General Counsel in the Department of Commerce, the two
operating divisions with informal programs studied here, EDA and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have their own chief counsels.
" The Interior programs ranged from having procedures with seven ingredients (two
programs), down to those with five (one program), four (two programs), three (three programs), and two (one program).
,6, The Solicitor's office was instrumental in revising the internal review procedures by
establishing the Office of Hearings and Appeals. The Department's program policy office was
instrumental in setting up the program decision option document procedures, but to a large
extent these procedures are implemented at the operating level by attorneys from the Solicitor's office.
"I The author had difficulty obtaining information about HUD's informal procedures
from its General Counsel's office. Part of the difficulty was attributable to the many volumes
of procedures contained in the Department's manuals that apparently have never been fully
analyzed and indexed by the General Counsel's office, let alone published in comprehensible
form for the public.
6I As of January 1976, at least twenty-one cases (seven at the district court level and
fourteen at the court of appeals level) had applied Goldberg to HUD's informal procedures.
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Informal procedure summaries based on categories of programs
reveal that of the seventeen grants and benefits and six planning
and policy-making programs (categories one and four), nineteen
employed procedures with four or three ingredients. The other two
categories demonstrate a variety of procedural ingredients. Category two, licensing, has twelve programs, most of which provide
numerous procedural ingredients. 64 Given the high value placed on
licensing from the traditional right-privilege perspective, 6 5 this result is not surprising. What is surprising is that two of the licensing
programs provide three ingredients. 6 Category three, inspections,
is predictably short on procedural ingredients. Of the five programs
studied, none has more than two ingredients," 7 which suggests that
the inspection process is in fact the least adversary of the informal
programs studied.
These empirical compilations provide some objective answers
to the questions concerning the relevance and impact of Goldberg
upon informal adjudications raised at the outset of this study.' It
would seem from the objective evidence here presented that
Goldberg has been manifestly irrelevant to the selection of procedural ingredients in informal adjudications. But the survey also
included a subjective component that suggests Goldberg has had
some impact upon agency thinking about procedures. The various
agency personnel contacted initially were requested in a follow-up
inquiry to describe the role Goldberg and its progeny actually had
All involved treatment of tenants in subsidized housing (evictions, rent increases, lease renewals, and tenant complaints). The rent increase cases discussed earlier offer a variety of
procedural formulations, one of which HUD has enacted into its procedural regulations. See
note 36 supra. The judicial activity involving HUD during the period studied can be contrasted to the situation of Commerce, where no cases questioning the Department's informal
procedures were discovered, and Interior, where only one such case was discovered. See Janis
v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on other grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1975) (posttermination hearing for employees of tribal governments held adequate under
Goldberg). See also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (eligibility for BIA general assistance
benefits must be clarified in procedural regulations) (discussed in text at notes 212-16 infra).
It should be remembered that no survey of NEPA cases involving these agencies was undertaken during this period; the focus was entirely on Goldberg kinds of informal adjudication
procedures.
" Two of the programs provide nine ingredients, two provide eight, three provide seven,
one provides six, and one provides five.
'" See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HAJv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
' The two Interior programs are permits under the Marine Mammal and Endangered
Species Acts and Park Service public use permits. A partial explanation for these spare
procedures may lie in the fact that much of the decision making is done in negotiation and
preapplication stages, and very few applications are ultimately denied. See note 126 supra.
"s Three had two, and two, none.
IM See p. 740 supra.
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in the drafting of informal procedures. Since most of the informal
procedural regulations studied were enacted subsequent to the
Goldberg decision,' 69 some relationship between them was suggested. Responses indicated that while the agency personnel were
certainly not unaware of the Goldberg movement, procedures were
7
not enacted precisely with the Goldberg ingredients in mind.' 1
Rather the survey indicated a general level of awareness of the new
judicial focus on procedural due process that was occasionally translated into specific procedural regulations. These conclusions would
not seem dependent upon the precise programs explored here for
theoretical support. The particular agency programs surveyed are
not unique or unrepresentative of informal procedures found in government agencies generally. Studies of licensing decisions by the
federal banking agencies reveal comparable procedural informality, 7' as do other diverse functions like New York Stock Exchange
disciplinary proceedings' 72 and Clemency Board pardon and discharge proceedings.1 73 Once outside the structures of formal adjudi,"9 Of the forty-two functions studied, thirty-two had procedural regulations that were
promulgated subsequent to March 1970, when Goldberg was decided. It is possible, however,
that many of those regulations repromulgated procedures similar to those contained in earlier
regulations.
"I The reaction of most of the agency personnel to the inquiry was that Goldberg and
its progeny have generally led to an increased awareness of the need to provide due process
hearings. E.g., NOAA memorandum to author, Nov. 10, 1975. This sensitivity to procedural
due process is reflected by personnel at USDA who indicated that, while there are no procedural regulations in force, "due process hearings" would be provided if requested. See note
134 supra.
,'7 The banking agencies (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp.) have
various licensing functions related to approval of branches and charters, and other matters.
The usual procedures are quite sparse, involving notice to the applicant, an impartial decision
maker (ingredients 1 and 10), and some internal review, but rarely any other hearing ingredients. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970) (Comptroller of the Currency). Professor Scott in his
study for the Administrative Conference recommended, however, that "[a]t this stage...
the pressing need is for the articulation of policy rather than for trial-type hearings." See
Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the FederalBanking Agencies, 42 U.
Cm. L. REv. 235, 290 (1975). But see Murphy, What Reason for the Quest?: A Response to
Professor Scott, 42 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 299 (1975).
"I The NYSE has established procedures in its constitution for disciplinary actions
against members and nonmembers. These procedures (which lack ingredients 6, 7, and 8)
were inspired by Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), rather than
Goldberg. See note 2 supra. In addition, in 1975 amendments, the SEC, which until then had
no jurisdiction over NYSE disciplinary proceedings, was given explicit authority to review
these decisions. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(d)(3) (Supp. 1976). Presumably, the SEC will now be able
to evaluate the Exchange's procedures as well.
,"3 See 39 Fed. Reg. 41351 (1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 12763 (1975). Applications
to the Board are initially submitted to an "action attorney," who prepares a case summary
in writing, subject to additional written comments (of up to three pages) from the applicant.
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cation under the APA, government agencies appear to have taken
advantage of the ability to decide matters informally.
III.

AN ASSESSMENT OF INFORMAL ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES

The foregoing sections develop the study of informal adjudication procedures deductively and inductively. It is the task of this
section to convert these theoretical and empirical predicates into
overall hypotheses about procedures for informal adjudication. The
evidence heretofore adduced tends to cluster around certain core
concepts that deserve further emphasis. These include the use of a
scale ranging from minimum to maximum informal procedures to
measure adversariness incrementally, as well as a dichotomous
measure that places procedures into adversary and inquisitorial
molds. The notions behind the balancing and valuing of interests
and procedures are also central here, and analogues can be drawn
to related ideas, such as the zone of interests test and the jurisdictional amount requirement, in an effort to calibrate the balancing
process. A sharpening of fundamental procedural ingredients will
also be undertaken through a closer look at the impartiality, notice,
and statement of reasons requirements. Finally, emphasis will be
placed upon implementation of these concepts through the device
of procedural rulemaking.
A.

Minimum and Maximum Procedures

First of all, the survey clearly reveals that the ten procedural
ingredients mandated by Goldberg have not been generalized
throughout the system of informal adjudication. Of the forty-two
programs studied, only two contained all ten Goldberg ingredients,
and most contained far fewer than ten. Moreover, in the grant and
benefit category, which implicates Goldberg directly, the usual procedural formulation contains only three or four ingredients. But
these empirical results do not necessarily mean that the programs
The Board reviews and acts upon each case summary and will grant an oral appearance if
need for it is shown in a written statement by the applicant. Presidential Clemency Board
Administrative Procedures and Substantive Standards § 101.9(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 12765 (1975).
At this appearance, the applicant may be represented by counsel. Thus the Board's procedures appear to contemplate the minimum three (or four) procedural ingredients referred to
throughout the study. As an advisory executive agency, the Board considers itself not bound
by the APA, but it goes on to state:
Nonetheless within the time and resource constraints governing it, the Board wishes to
adhere as closely as possible to the principles of procedural due process. The administrative procedures established in these regulations reflect this decision.
40 Fed. Reg. at 12763.
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studied are inconsistent with sound procedure or due process.
Goldberg itself contained the seeds of an interest balancing theory
for evaluating informal procedures, an approach that has grown
considerably in the last six years. The balancing approach is clearly
reflected in the Supreme Court and circuit court opinions that have
cited Goldberg during this period, which suggest that the case has
largely been limited to its factual context (i.e., termination of
welfare-type benefits)."' The empirical survey of agency practice is
consistent with the judicial trend. Full Goldberg ingredients are
required in the one grant and benefit program, the food stamp program, that most closely resembles the program reviewed by
Goldberg,'7 5 and substantial ingredients are required in the other
grant and benefit program, loans and grants to Indians, that raises
Goldberg concerns. 7 ' This kind of parallelism between judicial dictates and agency practice suggests that the agencies surveyed, while
not generally requiring the full measure of Goldberg ingredients,
have not ignored the Goldberg criteria for assessing informal proce77
dures. ,
Just as the survey tends to confirm certainaccepted limits on
the use of maximum Goldberg ingredients, it also suggests limits on
the appropriate minimum number of procedural ingredients. It will
be recalled that support for a three-ingredient procedural minimum
for informal adjudication was drawn from an analogy to the existing
framework for informal rulemaking: notice, comment, and reasons. 78 These three ingredients might become four in a particular
case if oral comment is added to written-an option left to the
"I The one Supreme Court opinion which required full Goldberg ingredients was the
companion case of Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (old age benefits). Two circuit
court opinions have required full Goldberg ingredients. Mothers' & Childrens' Rights Organization v. Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972) (welfare benefits); Williams v. Weinberger,
494 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1974) (Social Security disability benefits). The case survey concluded
with volumes 95 of the Supreme Court Reporter and 508 of the Federal Reporter (2d Series).
"I See note 83 supra.It should be noted that the other ten-ingredient program, determination of crop quotas for support payments by USDA, cannot be easily explained by analogy
to Goldberg. One would not think of farmers' subsidies as having the same value as welfare
payments on the "brutal need" scale. Perhaps the explanation for this "excessive" formality
lies in the fact that the impartiality of the local review committees is somewhat questionable.
See text and notes at notes 84-87 supra.
, ' The BIA-administered grant and loan programs offer Indians benefits akin to those
provided by welfare programs. On the value of interest scale, these programs are presumably
worth more to Indians than grants are worth to farmers or fishermen.
"I Some reservation on this score may be warranted with respect to HUD's rent increase
procedures, which provide sparse procedural ingredients for presumably important interests.
But the cases themselves manifest some difficulty in striking the proper procedural balance
for this function. See notes 36, 127, 163 supra.
' See text and notes at notes 35-36 supra.
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discretion of the decision maker under section 553(c) of the APA.7 9
The survey shows these three (or four) ingredients to be the predominant informal procedural motif in the programs studied, especially
those in the category of grants and benefits. This is an impressive
empirical confirmation of a theoretical postulate. The importance
of discovering a procedural minimum for informal adjudication is
that this limits the scope of debate over the kinds of procedural
ingredients necessary to satisfy due process. Unless a case can be
made for inquisitorial-type informal procedures, the choice of procedures in the particular case falls within a range from those employed
in the usual informal adjudication (the minimum) to those employed by Goldberg itself (the maximum). Choices can be made
within this spectrum by employing the benefit-cost analysis described earlier and the kind of judicial scrutiny now utilized to
determine when additional procedures are required in informal rulemaking.'8 0
B.

Inquisitorial and Adversary Solutions

The empirical study is useful in determining when nonadversary or inquisitorial procedural solutions might be acceptable. Five
programs had less than the three-ingredient adversary minimum.
Their procedures can be defended by the analysis suggested here
only on the basis that they need not adhere to the adversary model
at all. Since these programs fall within the inspection, grading, and
auditing category, that defense can be made.' 8 ' Inspections and audits are conducted by government personnel or private licensees
under established and accepted standards. Erroneous determinations resulting from initial inspections or audits are generally attacked not by adversary hearings but by reinspections or reaudits
'"'Judge Friendly would require the addition of the oral comment ingredient if written
comments are an unrealistic option for the particular affected individual. See note 44 supra.
Presumably, failure of the decision maker to make the oral comment option available in
these circumstances would constitute an abuse of discretion. See Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 946 (D. Del. 1973).
"I For a discussion of the utility of additional procedures in the informal rulemaking
context, which could be extended by analogy to informal adjudication, see Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" Under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42
U. Cm. L. REv. 401 (1975).
"' The five programs are fish inspections and grading, lead base paint inspections, and
auditing of outdoor recreation grants with two ingredients and meat and poultry inspections
and grading and plant quarantine inspections with none. See notes 129-31 supra.While meat
and poultry and plant quarantine inspections are currently without prescribed procedures,
see note 134 supra, they are functionally similar to the other inspections and can be judged
along with them for purposes of prescribing appropriate procedures.
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by different personnel. In the programs studied, this alternative to
adversary hearings appears both satisfactory, in that judicial appeals from reinspections are rarely sought,'82 and efficient, in that
the cost to the government per transaction is minimal."3 This experience would seem to support the Thibaut-Walker proposition that
agreed-upon standards, time pressure, and correspondent interests
are likely to produce inquisitorial solutions that are fair and satisfactory to the participants.
C.

Balancing and Valuing Interests

1. The Balancing Process. The theoretical discussion in Part
I suggested several ways in which the balance between individual
and governmental interests should be struck in differing procedural
contexts. These theoretical postulates received significant confirmation from the empirical survey. For example, the most adversarial
category studied turned out to be licensing, authorizing, and accrediting. This result would tend to support the high value Judge
Friendly placed upon the individual interest at stake in the revocation of professional licenses. 84 Moreover, the Thibaut-Walker
satisfaction-fairness criteria would also call for adversary procedures here since the government's relationship to the individual
licensee is characterized by a high degree of conflict. This is in part
because the purpose of licensing and accrediting is not only to create
a class of qualified specialists but also to police the conduct of the
members of this class. For example, the debarring of responsibly
connected employees of PACA licensee violators is a government
program with an admittedly punitive purpose. 85' In these circumstances, one would expect to find more adversary procedural ingredients present.
On the other hand, the empirical survey does not fully support
the theoretical assumption that procedures for administering grant
and benefit programs should be available in inverse proportion to
the ability of the program to meet available demand.' 6 Where, for
,2 See notes 129-31 supra. It should be noted that USDA provides informal adversary
appeals from veterinary inspections. See text at note 134 supra.
'8 The agency costs for veterinarian inspections and outdoor recreation audits are estimated at between $100 and $150 per transaction. See notes 129, 134 supra. The lowest
estimated agency cost for individual adversary hearings recorded in the survey was $500 for
USDA quota reviews, and this total assumes the existence of volunteer decision makers who
are compensated at a markedly lower rate than full-time government employees. See note 87
supra.
'
See p. 747 supra.
'
See note 103 supra.
I
There were several programs that appear to satisfy the theoretical model. For exam-
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example, the grant or benefit was part of a limited amount adequate
to serve only a few of the potential beneficiaries, the situation was
expected to involve a high degree of conflict and thus to be a natural
setting for adversary procedures. Where, on the other hand, the
grants and benefits were designed to serve an entire designated
class, the interests of the applicant and the decision maker could
be viewed as more congruent, suggesting an appropriate setting for
inquisitorial decision making. The data show that in some circumstances where the benefits are quite limited compared with the
potential beneficiaries, the procedures are often minimal or even
inquisitorial; this is especially the case with the various EDA grant
and loan programs and to some extent with the HUD programs as
well. Conversely, in the circumstances where there appear to be
adequate funds to satisfy an entire class of beneficiaries, elaborate
adversary procedures are often employed; this is the case with the
various USDA farmers' loan and subsidy programs and the welfaretype programs such as the food stamp program. Of course, this was
the situation in Goldberg itself.
However, there may be ways to reconcile the above deviations
with the theoretical postulates.' 7 First, it may be that long-standing
cultural presumptions in favor of the adversary system have simply
skewed procedures in that direction even though adversary procedures might not fit well in a particular substantive setting. There
is some sense of this tendency in Goldberg, where the Court is partially concerned with providing welfare recipients with the "badges"
of new property, one of which is the traditional adversary system.' 8
Moreover, there may be a concern in the welfare cases that the
theoretical correspondence between the goals of the welfare system
and the needs of qualified recipients is not fully reflected in the
pIe, the BIA grant and loan programs fall into the limited-pie, adversary procedures category;
and the Commerce loan and guarantee programs for fishermen fall into the unlimited-pie,
inquisitorial category.
'"I The procedures of some of the programs might be explained on grounds such as the
universal acceptability of scientific standards justifying inquisitorial procedures. See text and
note at note 66 supra. Grants to individuals under the Marine Mammal Act, for example,
have few procedural ingredients, see note 126 supra, but the awards are usually made by a
government scientist to members of the scientific community.
'1 The source of inspiration for the Goldberg Court here was Professor Charles Reich,
who had advocated the use of "full adjudicative procedures" to protect the individual's
interest in welfare benefits. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1253 (1965). This approach had the effect of converting the
procedures surrounding the right to welfare into an aspect of the right itself, thus subordinating questions about what would be a better procedural solution from a system perspective.
See Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
845, 851-56 (1975).
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attitude of the decision makers. The fear that deciders, especially
at the state level, are insensitive or even antagonistic to their
clients' needs could well cause a heightened concern about the need
for adversary procedures.'8 9
When it comes to grant and benefit programs that demonstrate
a notable lack of adversary procedures, different explanations must
be sought. One explanation is suggested by the "low profile" policy
of the Economic Development Administration. Congress has frequently established broad social programs funded at a fixed level for
limited periods, and has delegated the task of fixing the beneficiary
universe to the agency charged with the program's administration.
The EDA, for example, is told by Congress to administer economic
development programs in underdeveloped areas where there is a
sudden rise in unemployment. 9 0 To limit the class of eligibles, the
EDA engages in a policy of "low profiling" the availability of its
grant and benefit programs. This policy, which was discussed earlier, 19' artificially reduces available demand for the program's benefits and conceals potential conflicts that could generate a need for
adversary procedures. Thus the "low profile" approach may be seen
as distorting an environment otherwise appropriate for adversary
procedures and thereby frustrating system goals in the long run.
"I See generally Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administrationof Aid to Families
with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971). The problem of determining
whether administrators of the welfare system, or any other government program, should be
sympathetic to the goals of the program is a difficult one. See V. THOMPSON, WITHOUT SYMPATHY OR ENTHUSIASM: THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPASSION (1975). When it becomes
clear that the administrators are unsympathetic to program goals, the best way to check
potentially discriminatory administration is to invoke the adversary system and wrest control
of the process from the decision maker. But where the administrators are sympathetic with
program goals, as in the Veterans Administration benefit programs, something less than
adversary procedures may be desirable. Indeed, Congress has even seen fit to deny judicial
review of Veterans Administration decisions, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970), apparently out of
confidence that the program is properly (and generously) administered at the agency level.
See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). But see Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295
(D. Md. 1975) (termination of V.A. pension requires Goldberg hearing). Professor Popkin's
study for the Administrative Conference, goes into this matter in considerable detail and
statistically confirms the relative generosity of V.A. program administration as compared to
welfare program administration. He also concludes, "The nonadversary system assumes that
the agency will not be hostile to the claimant and procedural protections will therefore depend
upon how favorably or unfavorably the agency views applications." Popkin, supra note 40. If
one of the conditions of the use of nonadversary procedures is finding impartial decision
makers, the irony may be that in order to get those who are more "impartial," decision makers
should be selected from among the program beneficiaries, as in the USDA farm subsidy
programs. See text and note at note 207 infra.
,90See 42 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. IV, 1974).
,9 See text and notes at notes 150-51 supra.
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2. The Zone of Interests Analogy. The empirical survey also
revealed certain informal procedural practices that could be used in
an innovative fashion to refine the theory of allocating procedures
by a valuation of interests.'9 2 For example, the food stamp program
provides full Goldberg procedural ingredients for termination of
benefits, but only partial ingredients for disqualifying food retailers
who are authorized to receive stamps.'9 3 From an interest valuation
standpoint, this distinction is most sensible. The true beneficiaries
of the government program are the individual recipients; the retailers are at most incidental beneficiaries. Moreover, the interest of the
recipient is far more significant than that of the retailer, who, although disqualified from selling to one segment of the consumer
market, can in most cases continue to serve the majority of the
market. The distinction is suggestive of a familiar one in the law of
standing. Since the purpose of the food stamp legislation is not to
benefit retailers, they are arguably not within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statute.'9 4 If the plaintiff seeking
judicial review can be denied access to the courts because he is not
intended to be directly affected, it does not seem unreasonable to
allocate the level of procedural protections in a similar fashion.'99
Of course, there are limits on using the zone of interests analogy to
determine appropriate informal procedures. Once the Government
acts, even incidentally, to benefit a particular class, it must do so
in a nonarbitrary fashion. This suggests the need for the threeingredient model as a due process minimum. To decide when to go
above this minimum, resort to the zone of interests concept may
prove to be a helpful analogue to the valuation of interest theory
already proposed. Certainly not all government programs will offer
as wide a variety of affected beneficiaries as the food stamp program. But there may be programs, such as health or disability programs, that involve cooperation from third parties in the private
132

See p. 747 supra.

",

See text and notes at notes 81, 110-13 supra.

' See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150

(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); cf. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961).
"I Professor Kenneth Scott has made a valuable analysis of standing in functional and
allocational terms. One point he makes that bears on the procedural allocation analogy is the
notion of a direct injury "setting in motion spreading circles of repercussions." When this
occurs, "usually the magnitude of consequences is diminished as one moves further and
further away from the point of initial impact, so that second-order effects are less than firstorder effects, and so on." Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 679 (1973). Under this analysis, food stamp recipients might be viewed as
subject to first-order effects, and retailers as subject to second-order effects.
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sector (doctors, insurance companies) who become, perforce, incidental beneficiaries of the government program. Procedures designed for these individuals in the manner suggested by the standing
analogy are unlikely to be wide of the mark for due process purposes.
3. The JurisdictionalAmount Analogy. Another procedural
innovation that could be useful in allocating procedural ingredients
above the due process minimum is that employed in PACA reparations proceedings. The PACA reparations procedures are in two
forms: a Goldberg-type oral hearing and a shortened procedure
permitting only written responses. 9 ' If the claim is below $3,000, the
shortened procedure must be chosen; otherwise either procedure is
optional. This jurisdictional amount requirement for additional procedural ingredients is a unique application of benefit-cost analysis
to the allocation of administrative procedures and could represent
a conceptual breakthrough for allocating informal adjudication procedures generally. It is reminiscent of the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for federal question and diversity jurisdiction in
the United States district courts,'97 a requirement which also has an
allocational purpose-namely to reduce congestion in the federal
courts. 9 ' The obvious difference between the two requirements is
that in most cases the federal limitation affects only access to a
particular forum"' and not the formality of the procedures available
in the particular case."0 ' But this distinction need not prevent the
PACA shortened procedure alternative from being more generally
adopted. So long as the due process issue is posed in efficiency and
I' See note

91 supra.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1970). There are also isolated examples of benefit-cost allocation of appellate court review. See 11 U.S.C. § 47 (1970) (appeals in bankruptcy cases are
discretionary if they involve less than $500); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970) ($500 amount for
interpleader).
"I'See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 (1972); SEN. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
" See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). There is considerable debate about the efficacy
of the jurisdictional amount requirement, which, especially as it applies to federal question
jurisdiction, has many "loopholes." See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970); P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO,
P. MISHKIN & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1141-43 (2d ed.
1973); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 268,
293-94 (1969). This debate is beyond the scope of this study, but its central concern appears
to be the unfairness of relegating certain plaintiffs to less satisfactory state forums, and of
occasionally denying plaintiffs a forum altogether (e.g., when it comes to enjoining federal
117

officials). See W.

GELLHORN

& C.

BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

148-49 (6th ed. 1974). The

consequences to parties confronted with the procedural ingredient jurisdictional amount are
not nearly so severe.
20 But even where the state forum is available, it may not provide equivalent procedural
ingredients. Discovery (Goldberg ingredient 6) may be more limited, and the judges may be
less impartial (ingredient 10) due to lack of life tenure and protected salaries.
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allocational terms,2"' it should be permissible and even preferable to
make those judgments in the first instance at the agency level, for
instance, in a rulemaking proceeding convened for that purpose.
D.

Fundamental Procedural Ingredients

1. The ImpartialityIngredient. The empirical survey also
sheds light on important differences in the treatment of particular
Goldberg ingredients among the programs studied. The variation in
the treatment of individual ingredients is illustrated by the differing
approaches to impartiality, an element highlighted by Judge
Friendly as a fundamental procedural ingredient.112 The Department of the Interior's recently formed Office of Hearings and Appeals appears to be an example of an internal agency reform that
has substantially increased the impartiality of informal decision
making at a low cost to the system. 2 3 For instance, two-thirds of the
Bureau of Land Appeals business is generated by initial informal
adjudications, the bulk of which are applications for benefits and
permits.2 4 The impression of attorneys formerly in the Solicitor's
office who have been separated functionally and physically from
that office and redesignated administrative judges is that resulting
decisions on informal appeals are less institutionally oriented, more
objective and ultimately more fair.0 5 Moreover, this new appeals
process is more streamlined in that it replaces a two-step Interior
appeals process that sent initial decisions first to the appropriate
Assistant Secretary's office for review and then to the Solicitor's
office for separate review on behalf of the Secretary. The new review
procedure is thought to cut the internal agency review time in half,
which should serve to increase efficiency and client satisfaction with
the process. While there are undoubtedly still serious problems to
be resolved with this appeals process,2 ' it remains a significant
211For example, North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), clearly support a benefit-cost approach to the allocation of procedural ingredients.
211See note 44 & text at note 45 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 140-44 supra. There have been no departmental studies
of the costs associated with the new appeal function, but informal estimates suggest that
there is little additional cost involved. This is because about the same number of lawyers,
some of whom had served in the Department's Solicitor's office, have been transferred to new
roles as administrative judges, and their staff support has not changed. Interviews with
OH&A, Oct. 31 and Dec. 9, 1975.
"I The benefits are mostly mineral leases; the permits are for rights of ways, ditches, and
canals.
"' Interviews with OH&A, Oct. 31 and Dec. 9, 1975.
' The appeals process has been criticized for its bifurcation of policy-making responsi-
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means of increasing impartiality in informal decision making which
should be instructive to other agencies.
On the other hand, the study looked at a program with one of
the least impartial tribunals. In the USDA support payment program, local quota review committees are composed of farmers (appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture) who sit in judgment upon
the quota awards made to other farmers. These decision makers are
not even USDA employees, let alone government employees who
have been insulated from other branches of USDA in a manner
similar to Interior's Office of Hearings and Appeals. Nevertheless,
these private "judges" do not necessarily violate the performance
criteria discussed herein for at least two reasons. First, they do not
stand directly to gain or lose from any particular decision vis-a-vis
their farmer colleagues."' This is partly because their jurisdiction
is over quotas that are fixed independently of their own quota opportunities; the pie of subsidies available from USDA is not limited in
a way that would compromise fair decision making. Second, the
procedures employed before the review committee are elaborate
enough by Goldberg standards to minimize partiality in judgment
and to expose it if it were to occur. This indicates what may be the
converse to Judge Friendly's impartiality principle (which suggests
that the more impartial the decision maker, the less the need for
other procedural ingredients). If, in fact, the other ingredients are
provided, an ostensibly less impartial decision maker may satisfy
fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction criteria.0 ' This conclusion sugbility between the Office of Hearings and Appeals and the Solicitor's office, and for the lack
of oral argument in the formal review process. See Strauss, Rules, Adjudication, and Other
Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the InteriorDepartment'sAdministrationof the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1254-60 (1974);3 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS oF ACUS 43, 451 (1974) (Recommendation 74-3). From the perspective of this
study, the procedural reform is significant despite these criticisms because it further supports
the theoretical postulates of good procedures advocated here. In particular, it should be
recalled that a high value is placed not only on impartiality but upon the availability of fast
and efficient internal review as well. See note 38 supra.
20 This distinguishes Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), where the optometry
licensing board consisted of members who sought to discipline (and disadvantage) theii
competitors. In some circumstances, however, USDA makes use of industry selected review
committees in a manner that comes closer to Gibson concerns. See Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Florida Tomato Committee charged with discrimination against Mexican producers).
20 It is difficult to tell whether these criteria are satisfied in the support payment program. The insignificant number of appeals to the committees, the lack of judicial appeals
from the committees' decisions, and a reversal rate of 36 percent by the committees, can all
be seen as relevant to the fairness and satisfaction criteria. The efficiency criterion is more
clearly demonstrated by the minimal cost to the government ($500) of conducting the appeals. See notes 85-87 supra.
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gests that "volunteer" or part-time decision makers may be useful
decision agencies that administer grant and
in other high volume
2 9
benefit programs. 1
2. The Notice Ingredient. The survey also underscores how
the notice ingredient, if it is to have meaning, must be designed
effectively to reach those within a presumed class of potential bene'
ficiaries. The EDA's policy of "low profiling," discussed above,210
is
probably the most conspicuous instance of inadequate notice encountered. Judge Friendly lists notice among his fundamental procedural ingredients when he discusses notice of adverse government
action. 2"' But the notice requirement is certainly not without meaning in the grant and benefit process, even though the concern is with
notice of program availability rather than notice of termination in
the Goldberg sense.
In Morton v. Ruiz,2 '1 2 the Court recently considered the notice
obligations of an agency charged with the task of allocating limited
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) general assistance funds among a
large class of beneficiaries. The BIA, acting under the authority of
legislation that theoretically extended eligibility for benefits to Indians living on or near a reservation, limited those eligible to Indians
on the reservation, and excluded plaintiffs who lived near the reservation. The Court found that the BIA could limit its coverage only
by developing rational "eligibility standards" when the limitation
"might leave some of the class otherwise encompassed by the appropriation without benefits."2 ' These standards were to be established
by rulemaking or policy making, and they would be "ineffective" if
merely contained in department manuals or developed in unpublished ad hoc determinations. 2" The Court's concern with the latter
forms of policy making is that they are contained in internal documents not designed to reach the public. Whether or not an agency
15
must decide all eligibility questions through informal rulemaking,
2" Such a course of action would undoubtedly be controversial in the welfare area; but

it should be remembered that one of the current problems in this area is the lack of sufficient
administrative law judges to handle the caseload at both the state and federal levels. See
generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1974).
210 See text and notes at notes 150-51 supra.
2 See Friendly, supra note 29, at 1280-81.
212415 U.S. 199 (1974).
213Id. at 231.
211 Id. at 232.
211 Professor Davis questions the Court's opinion on this score, since it seems clear from
other cases that the choice of rulemaking or adjudication remains within an agency's sole
discretion. See Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 823,
825-31 (1975).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:739

it is clear that more is required than internal policy formulation
designed not to give notice to the public. The EDA's "low profile"
policy, the admitted purpose of which is to reduce the number of
applications from eligible beneficiaries, is an "agency policy" designed to frustrate the notice requirement itself. As such it must be
considered questionable in light of the Ruiz case and the theories
behind the notice ingredient expressed herein. Since there are ways
of making notice of program availability more effective,216 efforts in
this direction may be required as a matter of procedural due process.
3. The Statement of Reasons Ingredient.Another insight generated by the survey regarding the treatment of specific ingredients
relates to a modification of the statement of reasons requirement
that might facilitate judicial review. A statement of reasons for a
decision has long been an essential predicate to judicial review and
a concern of due process. 217 Failure by an agency to provide some
contemporary statement of reasons for informal decision making
places the reviewing court in an unseemly dilemma. The court must
either exercise weak review over the informal process and affirm
even when in doubt about the basis for the decision, or engage in
strict review that can involve an unwarranted intrusion into the
decision maker's mental processes.2 8 When this deficiency occurs in
the context of informal rulemaking, the court can remand to the
agency with some confidence that a closer examination of the informal rulemaking "record" will yield a more precise statement of
reasons. 2 " But in the informal adjudication context there may not
be an informal record for the agency to examine, and the agency
may be forced to create one on remand. 220 This is a lamentable
deficiency of informal adjudication. 221 The survey provides a possible reform here, however. Interior's program decision option
26 See, e.g., note 126 supra (discussion of the notice practice of the Park Service). The
EDA could, of course, engage in rulemaking to identify the class of beneficiaries more precisely and in this way increase the general level of program awareness. In other agency
programs the beneficiaries may be sufficiently apprised of program availability from other
sources. See text and notes at notes 145-49 supra.
217See Friendly, supra note 29, at 1292.
"I8 See generally Nathanson, Probingthe Mind of the Administrator:Hearing Variations
and Standardsof JudicialReview Under the Administrative ProcedureAct and Other Federal
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975).
21 Recently courts have refined this process by requiring additional agency procedures
on reexamination. See Williams, supra note 180, at 425-36.
m In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), it took the
agency on remand four months to find and produce an informal adjudication "record." See
Nathanson, supra note 218, at 722-23 n.16.
2' See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 104-05 (1969).
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document has the potential to become a regularized decision record
for even routine informal adjudications. The purpose of the document is to have the responsible administrator consider decision options in a clear and systematic way. Once prepared, this document
becomes the ideal record on which to focus judicial review since it
reflects contemporaneous consideration of the issues under appeal.
If an important option is ignored, or ill-considered in relation to
others, the reviewing court can order a remand directed precisely to
that particular deficiency. On the other hand, if all an appellant can
do is argue generally about arbitrary decision making, clear thinking expressed in the option document should give reviewing courts
confidence in affirming informal decisions.
As currently conceived, the program decision option document
is limited to major planning and policy decisions affecting the environment; in this posture it has only marginal relevance to the kinds
of informal adjudications involved in this study. But the goals of
decision theory expressed in the option document are not at all
irrelevant to informal adjudication. The basic goal, to replace guesswork and "muddling through" with systematic thinking about public decisions, 222 is applicable to government decision making generally, including informal adjudications. It is true, of course, that the
time spent on preparing option documents for each decision will
vary with the importance of that decision. Less significant informal
22 3
adjudications are worthy of less time-consuming decision making.
When the Department of the Interior is preparing the master plan
for Yosemite National Park, it is making a $500,000 decision, and
when the Department's Bureau of Outdoor Recreation conducts an
audit, it is making a $135 decision. 22 41 The option document would
undoubtedly reflect this difference in value. But even for small decisions the goal of decision theory should be to reduce the tendency
2
of decision makers to act solely by intuition or snap judgments. 21
Moreover, decision theory is a sound way to encourage the use
of the inquisitorial model in the circumstances where the courts are
21 See A. RIvLN, SYSTEMATic THINKING FOR SocAL ACTiON (1971); Lindblom, The Science
of Muddling Through, 19 PuB. AD. REv. 79 (1959). Professor Rivlin finds "two major messages" in decision theory: "(1) It is better to have some idea where you are going than to fly
blind; and (2) It is better to be orderly than haphazard about decisionmaking." A. RviLIN,
supra at 2. Certainly these messages are relevant to informal adjudication as well.
z2 This is much like the kind of benefit-cost analysis that is undertaken when the question is how many and what procedural ingredients are necessary to a particular informal
adjudication.
2' See notes 123, 129 supra.
See Vaupel, Muddling Through Analytically, in IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN
MANAGEMENT 187, 188-89 (W. Hawley & D. Rogers eds. 1974).
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unwilling to impose adversary procedures upon informal adjudication. In Dunlop v. Bachowski,26 for example, the Court required the
Secretary of Labor to provide a statement of reasons before deciding
not to file suit to set aside a union election, but specifically negated
the possibility that the Secretary's statement could be challenged
in a hearing before the agency or on review. This decision has raised
the fear that the scope of review might be too narrow to be effective. 227 An agency's use of decision theory which can legitimate the
process of informal adjudication and yet keep it free from judicially
imposed constraints derived from the adversary model may serve to
overcome this fear.
E.

Procedural Rulemaking

Many of the ideas for improved informal procedures suggested
by the empirical survey could be addressed by an agency rulemaking proceeding convened for that purpose.2 8 For example, to implement the "jurisdictional" amount procedures utilized in the PACA
reparations program, an agency might request information on what
dollar amount would be appropriate to permit the invocation of
more elaborate procedures. 229 Another consideration to be explored
in this type of rulemaking would be the value of the particular
benefit or interest to the individual. Judge Friendly's hierarchy is a
2- 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
21 Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1975, 28 AD. L. REV. 131, 144 (1976).
22 This is a crucial aspect of the entire process since participation in a rulemaking
proceeding by those who will ultimately be subjected to the procedures should maximize the
satisfaction criterion suggested at the outset as a basic measure of agency performance. While
rulemaking about procedure is not the usual approach to procedural reform, there were some
notable (and commendable) examples of its utilization revealed in the empirical study. See
text and note at note 104 supra. For instance, the Grain Standards Act provides a "procedural
option" of informal or formal adjudication; unfortunately, since the choice of procedures is
left to the affected individual, it does not go far enough to ensure that allocational goals are
reflected in the choice that is made.
2 Presumably the choice would be between shortened procedures that meet the adversary minimum and procedures approaching the full Goldberg adversary maximum. The
PACA procedures conform to these minima and maxima. (The shortened procedure has four
ingredients and the elaborate one, nine. See notes 90-91 supra). In order to rise above the
minimum level, the jurisdictional amount should reflect the cost of providing the more
elaborate procedures. Estimates of cost per transaction could be provided by the agency itself,
subject to contradiction from interested witnesses. There is a danger, of course, that this could
deteriorate into a kind of public utility-type hearing dealing at length with questions about
joint cost allocation and other imponderables. It will be up to the courts on judicial review of
the rulemaking to prevent this from occurring just as they now must deal with the detail
required in such calculations under NEPA. Moreover, if more agencies engage in this kind of
procedural rulemaking, comparable cost figures will probably emerge, and unrealized procedural options will be discovered. Interagency procedural cost comparisons would, in this
manner, serve to enhance the efficiency criterion on a system-wide basis.
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helpful beginning, but it could be refined by comments specifically
directed to the matter from the affected individuals. For example,
rent increase or benefit reduction cases might be assigned a lesser
value (and fewer procedures) than eviction or benefit termination
cases. A rule might even fix a cutoff point for the use of the more
summary procedures (e.g., a 20 percent rent increase or benefit
reduction) tied both to the cost of procedures and the seriousness
of the interest. Additionally, the rulemaking process might examine
the possibility of employing inquisitorial procedural alternatives to
the informal adversary model that may be superior by the measuring criteria. For instance, if conference and inspection techniques
can be employed on a regular basis, the need for informal adversary
procedures (whether minima or maxima) will be reduced. In addition, a rulemaking proceeding could address the need for sharpened
notice procedures discussed earlier. In all of these inquiries the
agencies will be advantaged if they can inform the rulemaking pro2
ceedings with the results of social science experimentation. 1
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Little systematic study has been made of the way the federal
government in fact adjudicates informally.2 31 The foregoing empirical survey is designed partially to fill this research gap and to elucidate standards of general applicability for evaluating informal procedures. While much work, both empirical and theoretical, remains
to be done, some conclusions can be drawn at this stage.
It seems clear from this survey that while Goldberg is a benchmark for beginning the analysis of informal adjudication procedures, it is not by any means the last word. This is not because
Goldberg might be perishable as a precedent, as Arnett v. Kennedy
and Mathews v. Eldridge can be read to suggest, but rather because,
23

The need for measurement in terms of fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction presup-

poses a role for the social scientist. Agencies willing to experiment with different informal
procedural solutions before setting upon a particular procedural regulation will undoubtedly
be better informed and less dogmatic when the final choice is made. And there are accepted
methods for engaging in this kind of quasi-scientific research that can readily be applied to
the informal procedure context. See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASIEXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1966); Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 409 (1969). The latter paper considers among other things techniques for utilizing welfare recipients' judgments in evaluating changes in welfare delivery systems.
21,The Administrative Conference of the United States has commissioned some thirtyseven individual studies of the informal process over the last three years, but these studies
tend to be concerned with particular agency functions only and in many cases have not been
made generally available. See R. Hamilton, ACUS Memorandum, March 14, 1975 (summarizing the thirty-seven studies).
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as the survey indicates, Goldberg has not been applied with full
force to much of the federal government's informal adjudication
business. But the informal procedural schemes that depart significantly from Goldberg should not be read invariably to reflect procedural failures in the due process sense. In fact it would seem that
many of the Government's informal adjudication procedures can be
defended on theories reconcilable with Goldberg itself. To take but
one example, the procedures surrounding the inspection process are
in most cases notably shy of Goldberg ingredients, yet this process
appears generally sound from a due process perspective. A goal of
this article has been to illuminate and assess informal adjudications
that offer procedural alternatives to Goldberg and yet do no violence
to the procedural due process reforms that case supports.
Although Goldberg in its full procedural trappings may with
some degree of confidence be limited to its particular factual context, it is difficult to make further "due process" generalizations
about informal adjudication procedures. While many of the programs studied appear to work well with fewer than the ten Goldberg
procedural ingredients, more investigation is needed to make a firm
general statement about what and how many ingredients are appropriate to every program the government administers. The data base
and theoretical underpinnings of the foregoing study are inadequate
for such overall conclusions. As a result, this article cannot with any
confidence recommend a code of informal procedures or offer a polished theory for predicting appropriate procedures in the future.
The Informal Administrative Procedure Act, which Warner Gardner
22
once drafted to stimulate discussion, remains a distant goal. 1
The study does, however, provide a framework for analysis that
can be utilized to build generalizations about informal adjudication
procedures. If, for example, each agency were to identify its informal
programs, measure their procedural ingredients against the
Goldberg maximum and the minimum formula here proposed, and
reconcile any variations in terms of the standards and criteria introduced here, much more would be learned about the informal
adjudication process, perhaps even enough to construct that procrustean code of informal adjudication procedures that remain an
elusive ideal. While such an undertaking might take several years,
the rewards to the agencies, courts, and Congress are not difficult
to see. By all indications, the need for efficient, fair, and satisfactory
informal decision making will continue to grow in the twentieth
212 See generally

Gardner, supra note 12.
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century administrative state until it reaches crisis proportions; attempts made now to deal systematically and definitively with the
relationships between the individual and the Government cannot
help but reduce the potential for crisis.
Despite this need for further study, there are some conclusions
about aspects of the informal process that can be translated into
recommendations without delay. The obligation to publish and
make available procedural rules is clearly mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act,23 yet it continues to go unheeded. The survey data show that several agencies, notably HUD, Agriculture, and
Commerce's Economic Development Administration, fail substantially to publish their informal procedures in the Federal Register
or otherwise to make their policies publicly available as required by
section 552 of the APA. 234 This conclusion confirms the earlier analysis of the informal action studies prepared by the Administrative
Conference that revealed "a consistent pattern of failure to comply
with the requirements of [section] 552." ' 1 Certainly there need be
no reluctance to urge upon the agencies studied here immediate
compliance with the APA.
The study also suggests that notice of program availability,
which is an ingredient mandated by Goldberg, can be improved
considerably. In the case of the EDA, notice of program availability
requires a policy shift from a low to a high profile posture.236 Improved potential beneficiaries' awareness of grant and benefit availability, while often difficult to realize on a limited public relations
budget, should be a desired policy goal of all granting agencies.
Improved notice is especially necessary in an agency like the EDA
where regional and local program administrators have grown accustomed to dealing with an intentionally limited clientele.
There are other aspects of this study that must be characterized
as suggestions rather than recommendations. In particular, the idea
of improving internal review mechanisms by maximizing the impartiality of agency deciders bears further investigation. Given the
Supreme Court's interest in balancing the need for informal proce2

Section 552(a)(1) of the APA requires publication in the Federal Register of all agency

formal and informal procedures; section 552(a)(2) requires that statements of policy, opinions, and staff manuals that affect the public be made available for public inspection.
"' See text and notes at notes 133-34, 151-54, 162 supra.
21 Hamilton, supra note 231. There is also a need to publish indices to procedural
regulations, especially on the part of agencies like HUD that have shelves of currently unpublished procedural manuals that even their attorneys have difficulty utilizing.
21 See text and notes at notes 150-51 supra.
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dures at the outset with the availability of internal review, 37 the
approach recently implemented by the Department of Interior is an
invitation to reform that should be considered by all agencies. In
this and other situations, one senses that an agency's willingness to
explore and experiment with procedural alternatives in the informal
adjudication context will be respected by the Court.
Despite indications of procedural rigidity in Goldberg, the
Court seems more likely to be guided by the flexible approach to
procedural due process advocated in subsequent cases.2 38 The challenge to the administrative agencies is to ensure that the concept
of flexible due process involves a serious inquiry into appropriate
procedural solutions and not merely an acquiescence in second class
procedures for the resolution of informal adjudications. There is of
course a danger that such a devaluation will take place if cases like
Arnett and Eldridge are expanded upon indiscriminately. But to
return to the status quo ante Goldberg would plant seeds of frustration in many government programs that would grow into formidable
barriers to program effectiveness.
By following the analysis suggested here agencies should be
able to legitimate their informal procedures in terms of Goldberg
without being overwhelmed by rampant proceduralization. Indeed,
it is just as probable that agencies will discover ways of streamlining
their informal process by reducing the number of procedural ingredients attached to a given program, as it is that they will encumber
the decision process by adding ingredients. But the ability to get the
right fit between program and procedure lies primarily with the
agencies, since the courts are institutionally incapable of making
the procedural evaluations and assessments. Fundamental reforms
in the choice of procedures for informal adjudication can occur, but
it is up to the agencies to lead the way.
"I See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379
(1974); note 38 supra.
m See text and notes at notes 8-9 supra.

